## PROCEEDINGS AT HEARING OF NOVEMBER 25, 2020

## COMMISSIONER AUSTIN F. CULLEN

INDEX OF PROCEEDINGS		
Witness	Description	Page
	Proceedings commenced at 9:30 a.m.	1
	Troccomings commenced at 7.30 a.m.	1
	Discussion re witnesses	1
Charlene Cieslik (for the commission) Giles Dixon	Examination by Ms. Patel	3
(for the commission) Ryan Mueller (for the commission)		
Peter Warrack		
(for the commission)	Proceedings adjourned at 10:59 a.m.	67
	Proceedings reconvened at 11:13 a.m.	67
Charlene Cieslik	Examination by Ms. Patel	68
(for the commission)	Examination by Ms. Chewka	113
Giles Dixon	Examination by Ms. Magonet	141
(for the commission)	Examination by Mr. Gratl	161
Ryan Mueller	Discussion re scope of Mr. Gratl's examination	175
	Examination by Mr. Gratl (continuing)	178
Peter Warrack	Discussion re examinations	179
(for the commission)	Discussion re scheduling	1180
	Proceedings adjourned at 1:37 p.m. to November 27, 2020	180
INDEX OF EXHIBITS FOR IDENTIFICATION		
Letter Description	on	Page

No exhibits for identification marked.

INDEX OF EXHIBITS			
No.	Description	Page	
261	Curriculum Vitae of Peter Warrack	4	
262	Curriculum Vitae of Charlene Cieslik	9	
263	Curriculum Vitae of Ryan Mueller	17	
264	Curriculum Vitae of Giles Dixon	20	
265	Ontario Securities Commission Report - April 14, 2020	37	
266	Fifth Report of the Monitor - June 19, 2019	72	
267	City of Vancouver Memo to mayor re Bitcoin ATMS – October 30, 2020	105	
268	Central 1 Credit Union Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Requirements	154	

1	November 25, 2020
2	(Via Videoconference)
3	(PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED AT 9:30 A.M.)
4	THE REGISTRAR: Good morning. The hearing is now
5	resumed. Mr. Commissioner.
6	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Madam Registrar. Yes,
7	Ms. Patel.
8	MS. PATEL: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
9	Mr. Commissioner, today we are hearing from a
10	panel of individuals who are involved in the
11	virtual asset industry in various advisory
12	compliance and anti-money laundering,
13	counterterrorist financing roles. They're
14	appearing before the commission as witnesses
15	with expertise in their field garnered
16	from years of experience in both virtual
17	currency and AML roles in the virtual currency
18	world and traditional banking world as well and
19	as witnesses who, because of their current and
20	recent work, have good insight into the state
21	the virtual currency business in Canada.
22	And I'll ask, Madam Registrar they had
23	each, I think, indicated that they will affirm
24	this morning.
25	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.

1	THE REGISTRAR: Witnesses, please unmute yourselves.
2	Thank you. Would each of you please state your
3	full name and spell your first name and last
4	name for the record. I'll start with
5	Ms. Cieslik.
6	THE WITNESS: (CC) yes, Charlene Cieslik. First name
7	C-h-a-r-l-e-n-e. Last name Cieslik,
8	C-i-e-s-l-i-k.
9	THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. And Mr. Dixon.
10	THE WITNESS: (GD) Giles Dixon. First name is
11	spelled G-i-l-e-s. Second name is Dixon,
12	spelled D-i-x-o-n.
13	THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. Mr. Mueller.
14	THE WITNESS: (RM) Hi. My name is Ryan Mueller.
15	First name is R-y-a-n, last name M-u-e-l-l-e-r.
16	THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. Mr. Warrack.
17	THE WITNESS: Peter Warrack. P-e-t-e-r. Surname
18	W-a-r-r-a-c-k.
19	CHARLENE CIESLIK, a
20	witness called for the
21	commission, affirmed.
22	GILES DIXON, a witness
23	called for the
24	commission, affirmed.
25	RYAN MUELLER, a witness

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1	called for the
2	commission, affirmed.
3	PETER WARRACK, a witness
4	called for the
5	commission, affirmed.
6	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Yes, Ms. Patel.
7	EXAMINATION BY MS. PATEL:
8	Q Mr. Warrack, I'm just I'm going to start by
9	reviewing the credentials, the CVs of each of
10	the witnesses, and I'll start with you,
11	Mr. Warrack.
12	MS. PATEL: Madam Registrar, if you could pull up
13	Mr. Warrack's CV. Thank you.
14	Q Mr. Warrack, just can you confirm that you
15	recognize this document as being your CV? And
16	I'm sorry, Mr. Warrack, I'm not sure if you
17	responded. I didn't hear an affirmative.
18	A (PW) That's correct. I recognize this document
19	as being my résumé.
20	MS. PATEL: Thank you very much. We can take that
21	down now, Madam Registrar, and if we could have
22	that mark as the next exhibit.
23	THE COMMISSIONER: 261.
24	THE REGISTRAR: It's 260, Mr. Commissioner.

THE COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry. Thank you.

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(PW) That's correct.

EXHIBIT 261: Curriculum Vitae of Peter Warrack 1 2 MS. PATEL: Thank you. And, Mr. Commissioner, I'll 3 just note. 4 THE COMMISSIONER: Just to interrupt, Ms. Patel. A 5 small point, but was not the Chainalysis Reactor webpage 260, Madam Registrar? 6 7 THE REGISTRAR: Yes. My apology, I forgot about that. It's 261. 8 9 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you. 10 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you. THE COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry for the interruption. 11 12 MS. PATEL: Just a note, Mr. Commissioner. You'll 13 that note Mr. Warrack is wearing a face mask 14 today for medical reasons, and we just ask the 15 indulgence of the Commissioner to allow him to 16 continue to do so. 17 THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, that's just fine. 18 MS. PATEL: Thank you. 19 0 So, Mr. Warrack, you are a certified anti-money 20 laundering specialist; is that right? 21 Α (PW) That's correct, Commissioner. 22 And you are also a certified bitcoin specialist? O 23 Α (PW) That's correct. 24 A certified fraud examiner? 0

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And I'll note that you've twice received 1 O 2 recognition, both in 2011 and 2017, from the 3 Association of Certified AML Specialists as the -- or ACAMS, as the ACAMS professional of 4 5 the year and you were also the recipient of an 6 ACAMS public/private partnership award in 2018; is that right? 7 (PW) That's correct, Mr. Commissioner. 8 9 0 Okay. And we'll return to that, but I'll 10 continue with your background for now. And as your -- in your roles -- your current and former 11 12 roles and in with that expertise you have 13 knowledge of the requirements of the Proceeds of 14 Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing 15 Act, FINTRAC guidance and various Financial 16 Action Task Force, FATF, guidance documents; is that right? 17 18 (PW) That's correct. Α 19 Okay. I also note that your résumé indicates Q 20 you've taken the Canadian Securities Course and 21 Canadian Securities Institute chief compliance 22 officer exam. And so you also have familiarity 23 with Canadian securities laws; is that right? 24 (PW) That's correct. Α

Your résumé indicates you have over 30 years of

1		experience in the investigation, prevention and
2		management of serious crime. You started your
3		career in the British army where you moved into
4		military intelligence and then went into the
5		police service where you held the rank of
6		detective sergeant, detective inspector and
7		detective chief inspector; is that right?
8	А	(PW) Acting detective chief inspector.
9	Q	Thank you. And in those roles you investigated
10		terrorist and non-terrorist crime and later
11		economic crime?
12	А	(PW) That's correct.
13	Q	Okay. And you led the investigation of serious
14		and complex fraud, organized crime, money
15		laundering and terrorist financing?
16	А	(PW) That's correct.
17	Q	Following your military and policing career, I
18		understand that you moved into the private
19		sector in roles in intelligence and
20		investigations with banks. Is that right?
21	А	(PW) Intelligence, investigations, anti-money
22		laundering and risk management with two Canadian
23		banks.
24	Q	Okay. The first one was RBC. Can you just tell
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us what your role was there?

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1	А	(PW) Initially I was recruited from the police
2		in the UK to form and head up RBC's intelligence
3		unit as it related to financial crime.
4		Subsequently I was tasked with reforming RBC's
5		financial intelligence unit, their anti-money
6		laundering unit, through transitioning it
7		from a checklist approach to a risk-based
8		approach consistent with regulatory guidance at
9		the time.
10	Q	And you were with RBC for approximately
11		11 years. Does that sound right?
12	А	(PW) I believe I left RBC in 2010.
13	Q	And from RBC you went to the Bank of Montreal.
14		Can you just briefly describe your role there.
15	А	(PW) I was recruited by the Bank of Montreal to
16		essentially do the same thing that I did at RBC
17		in relation to upgrading their money laundering
18		function, their financial intelligence unit.
19		Once I had done that, I then was in a senior
20		risk management role and the senior Fintech role
21		specializing in virtual assets, cryptocurrency.
22	Q	Okay. And so it was in that role at the Bank of
23		Montreal that you first started work with
24		virtual currencies; is that right?

(PW) In a paid capacity. But prior to that, I

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efforts?

1		think probably 2014, now, is when I or even
2		before that, 2012 maybe, is when I first started
3		to take a real interest in cryptocurrency and
4		educate myself on the subject.
5	Q	In 2018 you made a move into consulting for
6		consulting in respect of AML compliance for the
7		virtual currency industry. Can you just
8		describe the work that you've done since 2018 in
9		broad strokes.
10	А	(PW) I resigned or sorry, I retired from Bank
11		of Montreal in May 2018, formed my own company,
12		Blockchain AML Consulting Services, which is a
13		consulting training company specialized in
14		blockchain technology, cryptocurrency. I also
15		have a contractual consultant arrangement with
16		one of the world's largest cryptocurrency
17		trading platforms, a company called Bitfinex, as
18		their Chief Compliance Officer.
19	Q	And I'll just note you're not here today as a
20		representative of Bitfinex or any other of your
21		clients, but rather in your personal capacity as
22		an individual with extensive experience in both
23		traditional financial institutions and virtual
24		currency service providers and their AML

- 1 A (PW) That's correct.
- 2 Q Thank you. Ms. Cieslik, if --
- 3 MS. PATEL: Madam Registrar, if we could pull up
- 4 Ms. Cieslik's résumé.
- 5 Q Ms. Cieslik, do you recognize this document as
- 6 being your CV?
- 7 A (CC) Yes, I do.
- 8 MS. PATEL: I'll ask that this be marked as the next
- 9 exhibit, please.
- 10 THE COMMISSIONER: 262.
- 11 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 262.
- 12 EXHIBIT 262: Curriculum Vitae of Charlene
- 13 Cieslik
- 14 MS. PATEL: And, Madam Registrar, you can take that
- down. Thank you.
- 16 Q Ms. Cieslik, you've got a master's degree in
- 17 criminology and you are also a certified AML
- 18 specialist; is that right?
- 19 A (CC) Yes, that's correct.
- 20 Q And just -- maybe I should have done this
- 21 earlier with Mr. Warrack, but I'll ask you. Can
- 22 you just -- can you tell us what is a certified
- 23 AML specialist? What does it mean? What does
- 24 that designation mean in your field?
- 25 A (CC) It is an accreditation issued by the

1		Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering
2		Specialists. It requires a period of study and
3		the writing of an exam and maintenance of a
4		certain skill level and experience in the
5		anti-money laundering compliance field, and
6		they're an international organization based out
7		of the United States. And I was a founding
8		member of the Canadian chapter, the Toronto
9		ACAMS chapter many moons ago. They do have
10		chapters around the world that allows people in
11		the industry to meet, attend webinars, training
12		sessions, et cetera, in order to maintain a
13		skill level and interest level and experience.
14	Q	Your background. You have, like Mr. Warrack, a
15		background of experience in your I guess about
16		20 years in both traditional financial
17		institutions and with virtual currency
18		businesses. And I understand that you started
19		your career with our Canadian regulator, with
20		FINTRAC. Can you tell us a little bit about
21		what your role was there. And am I correct that
22		you were there in fairly early days for FINTRAC,
23		starting in 2002?
24	А	(CC) Yes, I was there in the sort of very early
25		inception. I had previously worked for the

1		Auditor General of Canada. We had done an audit
2		of drug enforcement in Canada which led me to
3		you know, find out about FINTRAC's creation. It
4		was a newly created agency in respect of United
5		Nations requirements, so I had started there as
6		a junior investigator in the anti-money
7		laundering investigation unit. After one year I
8		had applied for and was promoted to an analyst
9		level. My role there was to investigate
10		anti-money laundering cases and make
11		recommendations for escalation to the committee
12		for disclosure to law enforcement both
13		domestically and/or internationally at the time.
14	Q	And you continued to have some interaction with
15		FINTRAC. You're on the FINTRAC virtual currency
16		working group and have been since 2018. Can you
17		tell us a little bit it about that working
18		group.
19	A	(CC) Sure. Yeah. I mean, that was part of the
20		outreach to virtual asset service providers in
21		aiding their understanding and development of
22		the new cryptocurrency-based regulations and
23		amendments to the existing regulations in order
24		to bring virtual asset service providers under
25		the auspice of the Proceeds of Crime (Anti-Money

1		Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act and
2		regulations.
3	Q	I note you've also participated in Financial
4		Action Task Force forums with respect to virtual
5		currency?
6	Α	(CC) Yes, I attended the public sector
7		consultation in Vienna in 2019 where the FATF
8		had come up with the recommendations, amendments
9		to existing recommendations to bring virtual
10		currency asset service providers into their
11		40+9.
12	Q	Your background you have some background as a
13		senior advisor at Ernst & Young and financial
14		advisory services, other a boutique
15		consultancy firm as well. Can you tell us a bit
16		about your work with traditional brick and
17		mortar financial institutions.
18	А	(CC) Sure. After my time at FINTRAC I did move
19		into big 4 consulting firms at the time when the
20		regulations were newer and burgeoning. My role
21		there was an advisory capacity as part of their
22		advisory services generally to advise
23		traditional financial institutions on the
24		implementation and interpretation of the roles
25		which, again, at the time were relatively new in

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1		terms of operationalizing. So I spent some time
2		working with I mean, at this point I think
3		I've worked with most, if not all, of the big
4		banks in Canada, smaller banks, credit unions,
5		financial services companies as well. Through
6		that I also spent some time in the United States
7		working with large correspondent banking
8		institutions there where they had gotten in some
9		hot water with regulators and were required to
10		complete look-back remediations of activity and
11		make certain reports to regulators that they
12		might have missed over the prior time period.
13		Came back to Canada and continued to do the same
14		thing for a little while with, again, the big 4,
15		consulting at a domestic level.
16	Q	And just to clarify. When you just mentioned
17		that you were consulting and helping
18		consulting with banks on the new regulations,
19		you weren't speaking about the new new
20		regulations from under the Proceeds of Crime
21		(Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act;
22		you were talking about the new regulations in
23		as they applied to banks back in the early
24		2000s?
٥٦	70	(GG) Was a Transport of the Control

(CC) Yes, yes. I mean, there were regulations

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Q

1		in place, but there were amendments made and
2		improvements made and banks were really ramping
3		up and becoming you know, working on their
4		anti-money laundering programs as this was
5		approximately 15 years ago. You know, there was
6		some work to be done in that area in terms of
7		regulatory compliance, control mapping, program
8		design, execution and reporting.
9	Q	Okay. And like Mr. Warrack, in early 2018 you
10		moved into compliance officer roles at virtual
11		currency businesses. And you were the chief
12		compliance officer at an Ontario-based virtual
13		exchange called Coinsquare; is that correct?
14	А	(CC) I'll correct you on that. I was the chief
15		anti-money laundering officer at Coinsquare, but
16		I was also the Chief Compliance Officer of one
17		of their US-based crypto-ATM businesses called
18		Coinsquare Networks.
19	Q	Thanks for the correction. You are now a
20		consultant on AML and anti-money laundering and
21		anti-terrorist financing matters for financial
22		services businesses and virtual currency
23		businesses in Canada and other jurisdictions?
24	A	(CC) Yes, I am.

And you very recently have started to act as the

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1		Chief Compliance Officer for another company
2		that operates bitcoin or crypto-ATMs?
3	A	(CC) Yes, that's true.
4	Q	Okay. Can I just ask you. We've had some
5		debate here about what the appropriate
6		terminology is. I've heard "bitcoin ATM,"
7		"crypto-ATMs" and also we had a witness
8		yesterday who preferred the term "kiosks." Is
9		there a standard that's accepted in the
10		industry?
11	А	(CC) I mean, I think it varies. I'm comfortable
12		with the term "bit ATM." I feel like it just
13		rolls off the tongue easier. But it does vary.
14		It depends on their usage, and I think their
15		usage is slightly different in the US than
16		Canada.
17	Q	Well, as long as we all know what we're talking
18		about.
19	A	(CC) The traditional white label ATM machines
20		that are not tied to any financial institution,
21		that these ones specifically cryptocurrency
22		purchase based.
23	Q	I just outlined your experience in broad strokes
24		and I'll just say that would you agree that,

like Mr. Warrack, as a result of the experience

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	I've just outlined, you have knowledge of and
	familiarity with the requirements of the
	Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and
	Terrorist Act, its regulations, FINTRAC guidance
	and various Financial Action Task Force
	guidances and publications that relate both to
	financial institutions and to virtual
	currencies?
А	(CC) Yes, I would agree with that.
Q	And I'll also just note that, like Mr. Warrack,
	you are not here today as a representative of
	any of your clients, but rather in your own
	capacity as an individual with extensive
	experience in both traditional financial
	institutions and virtual currency service
	providers?
А	(CC) Yes.
Q	Thank you. Mr. Mueller. I'm going to ask Madam
	Registrar to pull up your résumé. And I think
	it will be easy for you to confirm that this is
	yours because it has your picture on it.
А	(RM) Yeah. I'd recognize that head anywhere.
	Yeah.
MS.	PATEL: Okay. Madam Registrar, if we could have
	Q A Q

this marked as the next exhibit, please.

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THE COMMISSIONER: We're at 163, I think. 1 2 THE REGISTRAR: 263, Mr. Commissioner. 3 THE COMMISSIONER: Sorry, 263. EXHIBIT 263: Curriculum Vitae of Ryan Mueller 4 5 MS. PATEL: Mr. Mueller, you have 18 years of experience in 6 various financial enterprises, including payment 7 processors, and currently you are with a 8 9 cryptocurrency platform called Netcoins? 10 (RM) Correct. Α And your role there is as the Chief Compliance 11 0 Officer? 12 13 Α (RM) Correct. 14 0 Okay. And you are -- as we see in your résumé 15 here, you are a certified fraud examiner? 16 (RM) Yes. Α 17 Q Can you just tell us what a certified fraud 18 examiner is. (RM) Yeah, it's very similar to the CAMS 19 Α 20 credential. It's just offered by the 21 Association of Certified Fraud Examiners. 22 similarly to what Charlene mentioned with ACAMS 23 is there's a period of study, there's an

accreditation exam and there are ongoing CPE

requirements. I think some of the key

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Q

1		differences would be that the CFE credential has
2		a focus on forensic accounting and kind of draws
3		a difference between money laundering and fraud.
4	Q	You are also a certified anti-money laundering
5		specialist?
6	A	(RM) Yes.
7	Q	And a certified cybercrime investigator?
8	A	(RM) Correct, yeah. That one is offered by the
9		International Association of Financial Crime
10		Investigators, which is a similar network,
11		similar organization with lots of banking
12		investigators, lots of law enforcement,
13		et cetera, but it's similar.
14	Q	And in your current role
15	MS.	PATEL: Madam Registrar, we can take that down
16		now. Thank you.
17	Q	In your current role as Chief Compliance Officer
18		at Netcoins you create and maintain policy
19		documents, you conduct anti-money laundering,
20		counterterrorist financing training and you
21		manage your résumé indicates that you manage
22		"enterprise, AML and fraud efforts," and I
23		assume that means anti-fraud efforts?
24	A	(RM) Yes, absolutely.
24	A	(RM) Yes, absolutely.

All right. And as such you are familiar with

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Financial Action Task Force guidance with 1 2 FINTRAC, guidance with the Proceeds of Crime 3 (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act 4 and its regulations; is that right? 5 Α (RM) Correct. And also you indicate that you -- on your résumé 6 that you have a critical role in undergoing 7 securities registration and regulation, and I 8 understand that flows from the fact that 9 10 Netcoins is currently going through the registration process with the BC Securities 11 12 Commission? 13 Α (RM) Correct. We're doing a volunteer 14 registration as an exempt broker-dealer. 15 Okay. So you have knowledge of the -- both the 0 16 registration process and of the obligations which will apply to Netcoins upon registration? 17 18 (RM) Correct. Α 19 Q Thank you. 20 Madam Registrar, if we could please pull MS. PATEL: 21 up Mr. Dixon's résumé. 22 Mr. Dixon, you are a senior manager with Grant 0 Thornton Canada? 23 24 (GD) That's correct. Α

And you are the leader of the virtual asset risk

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advisory group; is that right? 1 2 (GD) Yes, that's correct. 3 Do you recognize this document as your résumé -as your CV? 4 5 Α (GD) Yes, I do. MS. PATEL: All right. Mr. Commissioner, if we could 6 please have this marked as the next exhibit, and 7 we can take it down. 8 9 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you. 264. 10 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 264. EXHIBIT 264: Curriculum Vitae of Giles Dixon 11 12 MS. PATEL: 13 And you provide advisory services to a range of 14 virtual currency businesses in your role at Grant Thornton? 15 16 (GD) Yes, that is true. And I would add that Α it's not solely dealers in virtual currency that 17 18 I advise for; it's financial services broadly. But yes, the virtual currency industry is one of 19 20 the segments that I advise to, yeah. 21 0 And can you give us an overview of the types of 22 advisory services that you personally have 23 experience in giving? 24 (GD) Sure. Yeah. So my -- I sit within a team

within Grant Thornton Canada called the

1		anti-money laundering and forensic advisory
2		team. So really what we do is we provide
3		consulting services to primarily financial
4		institutions. So, for example, helping
5		financial institutions to understand how to
6		comply with AML regulations, sometimes
7		conducting independent anti-money laundering
8		effectiveness reviews for those groups,
9		assisting with investigations into potential
10		wrongdoing, even assisting with remediation for
11		regulatory findings. There's a longer list of
12		services, but that's primarily what we do.
13	Q	Okay. And as a result of that experience, like
14		the other panel members here, you have
15		familiarity with the Proceeds of Crime (Money
16		Laundering) and Terrorist Finance Act, its
17		regulations, FINTRAC guidance and Financial
18		Action Task Force guidance?
19	A	(GD) Yes, that's fair to say.
20	Q	Thank you. I'm going to I'm going to start
21		by asking a question to the panel, and I'll
22		direct it to I'll direct who should
23		answer first just to keep some order. There's
24		been extensive media coverage in recent years of
25		virtual currency businesses that has been

1		unfavourable, and a couple of notorious examples
2		are well, one notorious example is
3		QuadrigaCX, an exchange that collapsed when its
4		founder died, leaving 76,000 users or so without
5 6		access to their funds and leading to a loss of approximately \$170 million of customer
7		funds.
8		So my first first, would you agree and
9		I'll direct this question first to Ms. Cieslik
10		that this media coverage has created a
11		negative public impression of the vulnerability
12		of virtual currency businesses generally in
13		Canada to fraud and money laundering?
14	A	(CC) Yes, of course I would agree with that. It
15		certainly is not a proud moment in Canadian
16		history of cryptocurrency.
17	Q	All right. And then the deeper question is
18		whether this is a fair perception, and I'll ask,
19		Ms. Cieslik, if you can start with that.
20	A	(CC) Sure. I mean, I don't believe it's a fair
21		perception. I do believe that it was quite, you
22		know, a headline-grabbing case and of course was
23		a terrible, you know, incident, but I do think
24		that that's sort of one large case, you know,
25		and of course there are a few others have

1		contributed to a poor image of cryptocurrency.
2		But just because there is this perception of it,
3		I don't want to give the credibility or the
4		credence to the fact that because there was one
5		incident, that means that every other
6		crypto-based entity or even blockchain-based
7		entity should be painted with the same brush
8		because there's a wide variety of actors in the
9		space at different levels of compliance and
10		operational safety and security. And I do think
11		it's unfair to taint the rest of the industry
12		due to the one incident.
13	Q	Mr. Warrack, are there inherent vulnerabilities
14		in the virtual currency industry as opposed to,
15		say, traditional financial institutions that
16		make it more vulnerable to money laundering and
17		fraud abuse?
18	А	(PW) Well, there's two different things, money
19		laundering and fraud abuse. So let me deal with
20		the latter first, if I may. You know, one of
21		the exchanges that was reported on unfavourably
22		in Canada relatively recently was which
23		collapsed was not due to much to money
24		laundering but to fraud, fraud on that exchange,
25		which caused them to have no liquidity.

In relation to money laundering and virtual 1 2 asset service providers, exchanges, 3 crypto-exchanges for want of a better 4 description, they have certain similarities with 5 the traditional banking system and then they have obvious differences, one difference being 6 7 the fact that cryptocurrency transactions are borderless, for instance. That would be a 8 9 vulnerability unless properly mitigated through 10 appropriate controls. There are others challenges -- I wouldn't 11 12 describe them at vulnerabilities necessarily --13 but the process by which one opens an account on 14 an exchange depending on the jurisdiction, 15 online, an online process. There are arguably -- or some people would argue that 16 depending on the nature of the token, for want 17 18 of a better description, the coin, that's being 19 traded, bitcoin being an example -- on one hand 20 people may argue that certain aspects of it are 21 anonymous, i.e., who owns these coins, on the 22 other hand there is a high degree of comfort 23 from the fact that transactions are visible, 24 they are public and can be tracked and that has 25 been manifested in a positive way in many

1		investigations internationally where criminals
2		have been caught basically because they engaged
3		in using cryptocurrencies.
4	Q	And we heard yesterday evidence from a
5		representative of Chainalysis, which is one of
6		those firms that provides that blockchain
7		analysis software that you were just describing.
8		Now, has whether or not the perception of
9		money laundering or fraud vulnerability is
10		merited, has exposure public exposure in the
11		media through instances such as Quadriga, which
12		I mentioned, and, Mr. Warrack, where you in
13		your reference to an exchange that collapsed due
14		to liquidity problems, were you referring to the
15		Vancouver-based Einstein Exchange?
16	А	(PW) That's correct.
17	Q	Has this media exposure caused any industry
18		response, and what has that response been? And
19		Maybe I'll look to Mr. Dixon to give the first
20		answer on that one.
21	А	(GD) Sure. Thank you. Yeah. I think it's
22		probably I mean, in my experience it's worth
23		noting maybe upfront that, you know, my personal
24		experience has been at least on the side of
25		the industry I'm seeing is that rather than

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those particular incidences causing some kind of 1 2 response -- and, you know, I think there was 3 actually very much a response happening before 4 those incidents happened and, you know, I will 5 say that there are a number of groups in Canada but also, you know, around the world and 6 international groups who are demonstrating a 7 level of, let's say, proactivity in regards to 8 9 compliance with either regulations that are 10 currently in force within Canada or elsewhere or, in absence of any formal regulation, you 11 12 know, trying to understand proactively what they 13 can do to better manage risk and so on on their 14 platforms. 15 So I think, you know, my experience 16 hasn't -- I haven't noticed a response solely 17 from those incidents. However, what I would say 18 is that -- and I can't speak to whether these 19 are directly as a result of these, but certainly 20 recently I've observed in the cryptocurrency 21 ecosystem there are, let's say, increased levels 22 of collaboration between different parties, 23 different types of stakeholders to -- that are 24 independently run and proactively set up.

there's an example -- I forget the name of it

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now, but there is a group of, for example, Asian 1 2 exchanges who have been able to set up 3 communication channels proactively by themselves to work together, for example, to alert one 4 5 another of hacks, hacks and potential thefts on their platform and, you know, for purposes of 6 their own protection but their customers' 7 protection also. 8

> I would also say -- and, again, not -- this isn't a direct response to those incidents, but it's somewhat timely as I'm sure we'll talk about it today, are other initiatives such as Project Participate and other public/private partnerships where, you know, there's a real effort within the industry to try to get ahead of some of this risk and understand how they can work together to better identify and manage risk across their platforms. So, you know, certainly -- I don't know if any one of those instances has sort of been a direct result of those responses, but it's certainly, I would say, warranted the need for them going forward, and I've certainly seen more of that happening in the last 12 months or so, or 18 months.

> There was a very long lead-up period between the

1		FATF starting to provide guidance for virtual
2		currency businesses and about virtual assets,
3		as the FATF calls them, and virtual asset
4		service providers, as it calls businesses that
5		deal with virtual currencies.
6		The first Financial Action Task Force
7		publication on it was in June of 2014 and the
8		response of the regulatory response, at least
9		in Canada, has been developing since then. Is
10		that a fair description of the beginning of that
11		timeline? And maybe I'll ask Ms. Cieslik.
12	А	(CC) Yes, that sounds about right.
13	Q	And my question following up on that. So the
14		and we'll get to the new regulations, the
15		amended regulations under the Proceeds of Crime
16		(Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act
17		that apply to virtual currency businesses, but
18		my question for now is that the period of
19		development between the Financial Action Task
20		Force first starting to publish guidance on
21		these matters and the coming into force of
22		regulations the Canadian regulations just
23		came into force in June of this year has that
24		caused any has that caused problems for the
25		industry in terms of knowing what its eventual

1		AML obligations are going to be, and has it
2		has that delay, in your view, allowed for bad
3		actors to take a position in the market?
4		And maybe I'll ask Mr. Mueller. I haven't
5		turned to you yet, so I'll ask you to give a
6		first crack at answering that rather long-winded
7		question.
8	А	(RM) Certainly. I think that a different factor
9		might be the jurisdictional laws as they apply.
10		So, for example, when we were doing payments for
11		crypto-exchanges seven years ago in Canada, we
12		had requirements that they have compliance
13		regimes, that they have customer identification
14		programs and so on. So there was not yet an MSB
15		requirement in Canada, but for them to access
16		financial institutions, we wanted that. Where
17		some clients would apply with us from fiscal
18		paradises or more lax jurisdictions that there
19		was no requirement. So I think it would be less
20		the time lag between an FATF guidance and local
21		enforcement and more just what the state of
22		compliance is in those countries.
23		So, for example, places that allow bit
24		mixers to operate would be well in operation
25		regardless of FATF guidelines and regardless of

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1		any delay in enforcement. And in my opinion,
2		like in Canada, you mentioned Quadriga, I
3		believe they were an MSB, so, you know, there
4		was no impact of that registration on their
5		behaviour.
6	Q	And I would just invite any other panel member
7		who had thoughts on that question to jump in.
8	А	(CC) Sure, if I could jump in there. I do
9		believe, you know, that it has been a longer
10		time lag than I think some industry participants
11		would have liked. My former employer had
12		petitioned to become a registered money service
13		business prior to this year's, you know,
14		addition of cryptocurrency. So I think, you
15		know, if you were working in the industry and
16		you were following where things were going from
17		that 2014 FATF, you know, guidance issued and
18		other things happening in the US as well which
19		was predates that, I think, slightly, that
20		you kind of could see where it was going and you
21		can get an idea that most people were most
22		countries were considering this to fall under a
23		similar regime to a money service business.
24		So in order to achieve the FINTRAC licence

as a money service business without crypto being

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1		included, the requirements for kit, transaction
2		monitoring, risk assessment training, et cetera,
3		you know, would have been fairly consistent.
4		You know, they were consistent with the existing
5		legislation, just without some crypto-specific
6		requirements. So there were efforts being made,
7		I think. As a Ryan had mentioned, people
8		requiring participants to start implementing
9		these things that were already documented and in
10		law for traditional money services businesses.
11		(PW) If I could add something to that,
12		Commissioner.
13	Q	Please go ahead.
14	А	(PW) yeah, I think it is correct to say there
15		was a gap, a time lag, between FATF's initial
16		publication circa 2014 and the regulations more
17		recently in Canada. But I think it's also fair
18		to say that, not just in Canada but also
19		internationally, increasingly that gap was
20		filled by people in the private sector taking
21		steps themselves to put into place policies,
22		procedures, shared best practice, et cetera.
23		For instance, going back a couple of years,
24		maybe three or four years, we started to see the
25		appointment of people like myself from the

included, the requirements for KYC, transaction

1		traditional financial industry into the
2		crypto-world and that transferred knowledge into
3		that world to strengthen the regime within the
4		crypto-sector.
5	Q	The delay in your view, Mr. Warrack, was the
6		delay between FATF starting to look at this in
7		2014 or starting to publish on it in 2014 and
8		implementation of regulations, is any of that
9		attributable to a lack of expertise at the level
10		of oversight bodies and regulators?
11	А	(PW) Absolutely. Without doubt. At the FATF
12		level at every level regulators within Canada
13		until not that many years ago didn't have that
14		much knowledge, I would say. Similarly with law
15		enforcement.
16	Q	And do you see the state of knowledge improving
17		recently?
18	А	(PW) Not just recently but for a period of time
19		now, yes. Certainly.
20	Q	Okay. What efforts have you seen regulators
21		taking to get the kind of expertise that's
22		required to adequately oversee this industry?
23	А	(PW) Well, within Canada dialogue with the
24		private sector with people like myself,
25		Charlene, Ryan, et cetera. Internationally. I

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1		belong to a Europol working group up until
2		COVID, you know, where the annual meetings which
3		lasted a number of days where regulators from
4		around the world, including in Canada, would
5		come and converse and share ideas and best
6		practice and knowledge with each other, and
7		there were many other examples of that.
8	Q	So what you're describing is what you're
9		describing interactions of regulators with
10		industry members to acquire the knowledge that's
11		required?
12	A	(PW) Yeah. I would say it's a two way process
13		as well and the regulators imparting their
14		knowledge to the industry about what to expect,
15		for instance, from a regulatory perspective in
16		the future.
17	MS.	PATEL: Before I move on, I'm going to ask
18		just to give some context to some of the matters
19		that we've been talking about already
20		specifically Quadriga, I'm going to ask, Madam
21		Registrar, if you could pull up the Ontario
22		Securities Commission report from April of this
23		year. Thank you.
24	Q	This is an Ontario Securities Commission report

"QuadrigaCX: Review By Staff of the Ontario

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Securities Commission" dated April 14, 2020. 1 2 Can I ask the panelists if they've -- each 3 panelist if they've reviewed this, if they're familiar with this document. Mr. Dixon? 4 5 Α (GB) Yes, I'm familiar. 6 Mr. Mueller? (RM) Yes. 7 Α Ms. Cieslik? 8 0 9 (CC) Yes, I'm familiar. 10 And, Mr. Warrack? Mr. Warrack? 0 (PW) Yeah, sorry. Somewhat familiar. I did 11 Α 12 read it at the time. I haven't certainly read 13 it recently. 14 0 That's fine. Just establishing that we're all 15 familiar with it. 16 MS. PATEL: Madam Registrar, if I could ask you --17 I'm just going to go to the executive summary, 18 and I believe it's at page 3. So if you could 19 just scroll down. And this is, just for the 20 benefit of Commissioner and our participants, to 21 understand -- to give some context to what we've 22 been talking about. The -- at the executive 23 summary I'm going to look at the second 24 paragraph where it says:

"The collapse of Quadriga caused massive

1	losses for investors from Canada and
2	around the world. On January 14, 2019,
3	Quadriga announced that Cotten"
4	Gerald Cotten, its founder.
5	" had died in India the previous month.
6	By February 5, the Quadriga platform had
7	ceased operations and filed for creditor
8	protection. Over 76,000 clients were owed
9	a combined \$215 million in assets.
10	Approximately 40 per cent of these clients
11	were Ontarians. Ernst & Young, the
12	bankruptcy trustee, was able to recover or
13	identify just \$46 million in assets to pay
14	out to clients. The people who trusted
15	Quadriga with their money and
16	crypto-assets collectively lost at least
17	\$169 million."
18	And then I'm just going to go down to the
19	paragraph that starts with "it has."
20	"It has been widely speculated that the
21	bulk of investor losses resulted from
22	crypto-assets becoming lost or
23	inaccessible as a result of Cotten's
24	death. In our assessment, this was not
25	the case. The evidence demonstrates that

1	most of the \$169 million asset shortfall
2	resulted from Cotten's fraudulent conduct,
3	which took several forms."
4	The next paragraph, it goes on to describe
5	Mr. Cotten's fraudulent trading on the Quadriga
6	platform.
7	And the last paragraph there if you could
8	just scroll down a little bit, Madam
9	Registrar describes that he lost an
10	additional so he lost \$115 million from
11	fraudulent trading. The next paragraph says
12	that:
13	"[He] lost an additional \$28 million while
14	trading client assets on three external
15	crypto asset trading platforms without
16	authorization from, or disclosure to,
17	clients."
18	And what the Ontario Securities Commission
19	concludes here at the first full paragraph of
20	the next page is what happened that:
21	"What happened at Quadriga was an
22	old-fashioned fraud wrapped in modern
23	technology. There is nothing new about
24	Ponzi schemes, unauthorized trading with
25	client funds and misappropriation of

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1	assets. Crypto asset trading platforms,
2	however, are novel and the regulatory
3	framework for these platforms is
4	evolving."
5	And I just sorry, it's not the role of
6	commission council to give evidence here, but
7	just to provide that report for some context for
8	the discussion we're going to be having, and
9	I'll probably return to this for a couple of
10	points as we develop the discussion about that
11	regulatory framework that is evolving for, as
12	the Ontario Securities Commissions says here,
13	crypto-asset trading platforms but also virtual
14	currency businesses generally.
15	MS. PATEL: Madam Registrar, you can take that down
16	for now. Thank you. And actually, I'd ask,
17	Mr. Commissioner that the Ontario Securities
18	Commission report be marked as the next exhibit,
19	please.
20	THE COMMISSIONER: 265.
21	THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 265.
22	EXHIBIT 265: Ontario Securities Commission
23	Report - April 14, 2020
24	MS. PATEL:

I'd like to move into a discussion now of that

1		new regulatory framework that is being
2		established for virtual currency businesses,
3		businesses dealing with virtual currencies in
4		various ways. As I mentioned earlier, the
5		amendments to the Proceeds of Crime (Money
б		Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act came
7		into force came into effect on June 1st of
8		this year and further requirements will come
9		into force in June of next year.
10		And just to give us an understanding of what
11		is involved in this new regulation of the
12		industry, I'm going to I'm going to turn
13		again Ms. Cieslik, I'm sorry I've been
14		relying on you for some background here, and I'm
15		going to rely on you again because I know you've
16		been participating in this FINTRAC virtual
17		currency reporting working group since 2018.
18		Can you please briefly describe what are the new
19		obligations and requirements on virtual currency
20		businesses as of June 2020.
21	А	(CC) Yes. Sure. I don't mind going through
22		those at a high level. FINTRAC has defined a
23		virtual asset service provider or the act of
24		dealing in virtual assets as what qualifies any
25		kind of person or entity that would be subject

to this regime. So that was a start is defining

a virtual asset service provider and defining

what dealing in virtual assets means to them.

That in effect brought into place the registration requirement. So they captured this under the definition of a "money service business." So there's -- you know, there's three qualifying transactional activities that would make you a traditional money service business, whether it's trading FX, dealing in negotiable instruments or effecting some kind of transfer of funds on behalf of someone. They've added dealing in virtual currency to that definition, which, as I said, brings about the registration requirement. So you're then required to register your business with FINTRAC.

They have added an element of distinguishing between a local money service business and a foreign money service business and clarified some definitions around what would make you a foreign money service business in terms of engaging -- being engaged in any of the activities, having place of business in Canada, directing services at people who live in Canada and you provide services to clients who live in

1 Canada.

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2 0 And sorry, can I just ask you as a followup to 3 that. Are foreign money services businesses 4 also required to register with FINTRAC? 5 (CC) Yes, they are. They have some additional responsibilities to achieve that registration 6 versus local or domestic money services 7 businesses, but the program requirements are 8 9 similar -- you know, are the same for both local 10 and foreign in terms of you're required to have a compliance program, appointing a compliance 11 12 officer who's responsible for the development 13 and execution of the program, having policies 14 and procedures, a risk assessment, a training 15 program so that people at your company know the 16 roles and responsibilities, and this includes also a review of effectiveness through some kind 17 18 of external audit.

There has been a slight bit of confusion as to what is required to be implemented from the program perspective now and in the future, but through some clarity and some digging. Right now there are requirements to file suspicious transaction reports of any amount as per the traditional, you know, in-place suspicious

1		activity reporting requirements. There also is
2		the requirement to keep records obviously of
3		those filed reports. And you are required to,
4		you know, take reasonable measures to complete a
5		KYC on people that you are filing suspicious
6		transaction reports on.
7		However, the broader KYC, know your client,
8		requirements that are tied to money service
9		businesses for virtual asset service providers
10		don't come into effect until the following year
11		along with an additional large virtual currency
12		transaction report requirement and the travel
13		rule. I don't know how in depth you want me to
14		get on either of those things right now. I'm
15		happy to talk about those, if you want a little
16		bit of description of what those are.
17	Q	If you could give a little bit of description of
18		both of those, that would be that would be
19		helpful.
20	A	(CC) Sure. So as a money service business I
21		think I mentioned previously, a traditional
22		money service business has obligations as it
23		pertains to a transaction level versus an
24		account level. There are allowances under the
0.5		to the term of the term of the second of the

existing money service business law

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threshold-based transactions under which you do
not have to conduct KYC and over which you do.

That threshold is a thousand dollars. So you
can do up to a thousand dollars per transaction
with no KYC. That requirement to verify the
identities of persons over a thousand comes into
effect next year.

The travel rule, which again is part of

The travel rule, which again is part of
the -- sort of the, you know, international FATF
recommendations and all the working groups -- I
think that, you know, Peter had mentioned
earlier -- is that, again, similar to the
traditional financial entities and reporting
entities under FINTRAC, information must travel
with a transaction over -- of a thousand dollars
or more, including the name, full address, you
know, civic address as well as an account number
or traditional -- sorry, in virtual currency, a
virtual currency address must travel with
transactions and include the name, address and
account number or virtual currency address of
the recipient as well.

So those things -- and, again, a little bit more complex than the initial things that have come into effect this calendar year -- they are

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much.

slated to come into effect more robustly of 1 2 course in June of next year. You're muted. 3 MS. PATEL: It's bound to happen. I'm going to ask the panel members a little bit more about the 4 5 travel rule because I know it has been the 6 subject of some scrutiny and review by the Financial Action Task Force. 7 And just to ground this discussion I'd ask 8 9 Madam Registrar, if you could please pull up the 10 document, the Financial Action Task Force 12-month review, which we have as appendix F to 11 12 exhibit 248. And I'll give you a moment just to 13 find that. So if you could -- perfect. 14 you, Madam Registrar. 15 So this is a publication of the Financial 16 Action Task Force, the 12-month review of the revised FATF standards on virtual assets and 17 18 virtual asset service providers that was 19 published, I believe -- if you could scroll down 20 just a bit, Madam Registrar. I believe June of 21 this year. Thank you. And the part that I'd 22 like to go to is at page 143 of the PDF. And 23 actually, I was mistaken. If you could scroll 24 up slightly. That's perfect. Thank you very

1	Q	The implementation of the travel rule. The
2		Financial Action Task Force, I understand, sets
3		out here some industry concerns with the
4		implementation of this rule. And maybe I could
5		go to rather than me saying what the
6		Financial Action Task Force says that the
7		industry is concerned about, maybe I'll ask
8		industry members, you yourselves, what are those
9		concerns; what are the problems with this
10		obligation that Ms. Cieslik has just described?
11		And, Mr. Mueller, do you have any insight
12		into that?
13	А	(RM) Yeah, I think one of the key challenges is
14		that there's so many ways there's so many
15		wallet providers, there's so many ways to move
16		bitcoin and not all of them require KYC and not
17		all of them are going to be friendly to sharing
18		the same kind of information that you would
19		expect on a wire transfer. Additionally, you
20		could be sending cryptocurrencies into pooling
21		wallets that are then settled to an end customer
22		in the same way that, like, a correspondent bank
23		relationship might obscure end recipients. So I
24		think that's one challenge in implementing the
25		travel rule is getting all the players on board

1		and similarly having a common language to share
2		all that information.
3		We tried to do this when we were processing
4		payments for multiple cryptocurrency
5		exchanges years ago, and we found that everyone
6		had their own method to identify the device that
7		was initiating a transaction and not all of
8		those methods could talk to each other. And
9		everyone had their own language for encrypting
10		customer information and so on.
11	Q	And as a background question maybe I'll
12		direct this to Mr. Warrack Mr. Warrack, can
13		you explain what is the anti-money laundering,
14		counterterrorist financing value of a rule like
15		the travel rule? What does it get at?
16	А	(PW) It's designed to track and to have a record
17		of the movement of funds, so who is sending
18		funds to who, from what jurisdiction to what
19		jurisdiction, from what account to what account,
20		as Ryan has said, similar to a wire transaction.
21		And that information has obvious use to law
22		enforcement. If there is a crime associated
23		with those funds, law enforcement can then go to
24		the relevant exchange and get information about,
25		you know, who owns that account or who initiated

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1		that transaction.
2	Q	So it's critical information about what the
3		source of a transfer was?
4	А	(PW) Not just the source but also the recipient
5		of the the source and destination of funds.
6	Q	Am I correct, though, in understanding that the
7		problem from the industry perspective in
8		implementing the travel rule isn't so much with
9		documenting the recipient if you're virtual
10		asset provider. If you're on the receiving end
11		of a transfer, presumably you have that
12		information at hand. The problem is identifying
13		the sender. Am I right in that understanding?
13 14	A	the sender. Am I right in that understanding?  (PW) The problem it is a problem. The
	A	
14	A	(PW) The problem it is a problem. The
14 15	А	(PW) The problem it is a problem. The challenge with the travel rule is that no single
14 15 16	A	(PW) The problem it is a problem. The challenge with the travel rule is that no single technological solution certainly existed in a
14 15 16 17	A	(PW) The problem it is a problem. The challenge with the travel rule is that no single technological solution certainly existed in a workable format when this requirement, the
14 15 16 17	A	(PW) The problem it is a problem. The challenge with the travel rule is that no single technological solution certainly existed in a workable format when this requirement, the recommendation 16, was formulated by the FATF.
14 15 16 17 18	A	(PW) The problem it is a problem. The challenge with the travel rule is that no single technological solution certainly existed in a workable format when this requirement, the recommendation 16, was formulated by the FATF.  As one of the speakers had said, the requirement
14 15 16 17 18 19	A	(PW) The problem it is a problem. The challenge with the travel rule is that no single technological solution certainly existed in a workable format when this requirement, the recommendation 16, was formulated by the FATF.  As one of the speakers had said, the requirement is that the information about the parties to the
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	A	(PW) The problem it is a problem. The challenge with the travel rule is that no single technological solution certainly existed in a workable format when this requirement, the recommendation 16, was formulated by the FATF.  As one of the speakers had said, the requirement is that the information about the parties to the transaction accompany the transaction.

blockchain, but then how do you add or how do

1	you attach the information about from whom
2	the funds are going and to whom the account is
3	owned to where it's going in a way that's close
4	to proximate to the actual transaction
5	itself. You could send a batch file, for
6	instance, with all the transactions during the
7	day with the different solutions.
8	The good news is that certainly over this
9	last year the industry really has come together,
10	and I'm a big part of that discussion, to
11	establish a number of technology solutions. A
12	lot of work has gone into what Ryan was saying
13	about common standards, common language,
14	et cetera, similar to SWIFT terminology. And it
15	may well be that instead of one solution, there
16	will be a number of solutions which an exchange
17	will have to employ depending on who the other
18	party is that they're dealing with.
19	Just to be clear, in case there's any doubt,
20	the travel rule requirements under
21	recommendation 16 from FATF relate to
22	transactions between VASPs, so between
23	exchanges. It doesn't relate to a transaction
24	between an exchange and a private wallet, for
25	instance. Just between exchanges.

1	Q	And I'll just note Madam Registrar, if you
2		can scroll down to paragraph 45 on the next
3		page indeed the review concludes that it
4		"does not consider that these are fundamental
5		barriers to the continued development of
6		technological solutions to implement the travel
7		rule." And the just a little bit further
8		down it says:
9		" the FATF calls upon the VASP sector
10		to redouble its efforts towards the swift
11		development of holistic technological
12		solutions encompassing all aspects of the
13		travel rule."
14		So this is the Financial Action Task Force
15		calling out for assistance from the industry
16		essentially and asking for that type of
17		technological assistance that you've just
18		described is in development. Is that right,
19		Mr. Warrack?
20	А	(PW) That's correct. And there have been recent
21		discussions with FATF. I've been part of those
22		discussions, part of working groups in dialogue
23		with each other within the industry but also
24		with the FATF and other regulators. Just by way
25		of disclosure, I'm advisor to one of these

1		solutions. So there is a lot of work being
2		conducted.
3	Q	Ms. Cieslik, have I given you the opportunity to
4		go through the obligations that will apply to
5		virtual currency dealers under the new Proceeds
6		of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist
7		Financing Regs?
8	А	(CC) Yes, I believe I've covered them at a high
9		level.
10	Q	Okay. And so my followup question, and we kind
11		of got into it with the discussion of the travel
12		rule, is actually before I ask this. Do the
13		amendments place any obligations any new
14		obligations on traditional financial
15		institutions with respect to virtual currencies?
16		And maybe, Mr. Dixon, you're in a position to
17		answer this.
18	А	(GD) Yes. Yeah, they do. So there are
19		similar there are some overlap with more
20		traditional financial institution requirements,
21		for example exposure for a more traditional
22		financial institution's customer to virtual
23		currency over certain thresholds will at some
24		point in a future require additional
25		determinations for politically exposed persons,

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for example. Again, the reporting of large 1 2 virtual currency -- receipt of large virtual 3 currency and so on. So yes, the regulations 4 don't just pertain to dealers and virtual 5 currency themselves. They have similar effects 6 in terms of the requirements across other more traditional financial institutions, securities, 7 banks, even money service business -- more 8 9 traditional money service businesses. 10 (CC) I think if I could add to that, the law has been amended to say that any reporting 11 12 entity that deals in virtual currencies, those 13 that are under the law currently -- as Giles 14 mentioned, if you are financial entity, casino, 15 securities dealer, et cetera, if you deal in virtual currency that there would be these 16 additional requirement. I believe it largely 17 18 focuses on ensuring that you are doing 19 transaction reporting, the large virtual 20 currency transfer report, ensuring the travel 21 rule follows and of course including that as 22 part of your suspicious transaction reporting 23 model. But essentially how I interpreted it was that you can be a traditional financial services 24

entity and deal in cryptocurrency without

1		necessarily becoming registered but that you
2		would have these additional obligations with
3		respect to virtual currency.
4	Q	The with respect specifically to the issue of
5		customer source of funds, do the new regulations
6		address that?
7	A	(CC) Is this I should answer this?
8	Q	I think probably, yes.
9	А	(CC) The legislation itself does not reference
10		source of funds. Where source of funds has come
11		into requirements I shouldn't use that word
12		"requirements," but there is a requirement to
13		have a risk-based approach so to do a risk
14		assessment on your entity as a whole and its
15		exposure to money laundering and terrorist
16		financing as well as on your individual customer
17		base, whether they be human customers or entity
18		corporate customers. And that upon you know,
19		upon designing that risk assessment and
20		completing risk ratings, that one part of
21		enhanced due diligence would be recommended
22		under their guidance is to complete a source of
23		funds validation or declaration. I don't think
24		they use those words specifically but that one
25		way to mitigate your risk where you think

1		somebody has been rated high risk is to validate
2		or verify, come up with some kind of
3		documentation as to where they got their money
4		from.
5	Q	And I understand that registration as an MSB
6		involves some kind of criminal record check. Is
7		that right?
8	А	(CC) I would it's not for domestic money
9		service businesses but only for foreign money
10		service businesses under this law change here.
11	Q	Okay. Currently do registrants for MSB status,
12		whether as a virtual currency dealer or
13		otherwise, have an obligation to undergo
14		criminal record checks before prior to
15		registering or as a condition of registering
16		with FINTRAC?
17	А	(CC) Not that is specified in the legislation.
18	Q	I'm going to put a question to the panel at
19		large, which is what is the how is the fit of
20		the amendments and I appreciate that this
21		might be an answer that's developing given the
22		brand you know, the new status of the rules
23		and industry's efforts to comply with them, but
24		how is the fit of the obligations that are
25		required of money service businesses under the

1		act and the new requirements pertaining
2		specifically to virtual currencies, is it a good
3		fit with how the industry actually operates and
4		with how virtual currency transactions take
5		place? And I will start here with Mr. Warrack.
6	А	(PW) Yeah. Thank you for that. Because I don't
7		think it is a perfect fit at all. And this is
8		not just a comment regarding Canada, but also
9		internationally whereby cryptocurrency
10		exchanges, VASPs, basically have been fitted
11		into the label of an MSB, a money service
12		business. A traditional money service business,
13		you know, where somebody wants to remit some
14		funds to the Philippines, et cetera, is a very
15		different model to the way a lot of VASPs
16		operate where in fact they are actually trading
17		platforms with very, very different rules, a
18		very, very different activity to what would be
19		expected in a traditional MSB.
20		For instance, rapid trading, rapid movement
21		in and out of funds might be very normal for a
22		cryptocurrency trading platform, a VASP, whereas
23		in the traditional world and I believe the
24		sergeant from the RCMP the other day mentioned
25		rapid in and out movement as a red flag. It

1		certainly is a red flag in the traditional world
2		but in the cryptocurrency world, not
3		necessarily. And there are other significant
4		differences in relation to that.
5	Q	Are there any other aspects to the regulations
6		that are ill fits?
7	A	(PW) I believe so. And I believe well, my
8		answer is aligned to what I have just said. So
9		the requirement, for instance, to report the
10		receipt of virtual currency of \$10,000 or
11		more and there would have to be an automated
12		way to FINTRAC to me is somewhat ridiculous,
13		and I don't see any real value to the regulators
14		by trying to gain that information for a number
15		of reasons, not least for a trading platform
16		a cryptocurrency trading platform. It would be
17		very normal for a customer who's a trader to
18		have maybe thousands of transactions in an hour
19		above that amount in and out of their account.
20		Particularly if they're using automated trading
21		bots, et cetera.
22		I don't believe the regulations take into
23		account the concept of change transactions,
24		which could be in excess of \$10,000 or more and
25		would be captured, as I understand it, in the

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1	reporting	process.

2		And also although the I'm not sure if the
3		regulations but certainly the guidance from
4		FINTRAC talks to this: how do you value that
5		transaction? Every exchange has their own value
6		for the price of a bitcoin, for instance, at any
7		given moment of time. One exchange might value
8		it at \$10,100. Another exchange might value it
9		at \$9,600. There's no common standard. I think
10		they have FINTRAC or the regulations have
11		tried to capture that by specifying where you
12		got your information on when you submit this
13		\$10,000 report. But that would be my biggest
14		concern about the regulations.
15		And at the time, along with Charlene, I was
16		part of that working group that met with
17		Department of Finance and FINTRAC in Ottawa
18		quite regularly and I provided this feedback at
19		the time.
20	Q	You mentioned change transactions. And just for
21		the benefit of the Commissioner, can you explain
22		what a change transaction is and why it poses a
23		problem with respect to the records that have to

be kept or reports made to FINTRAC?

(PW) Yeah. The way -- using bitcoin as an

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Α

1	example, the way transactions are structured is
2	similar to the typical fiat currency
3	transaction. So if you have a 20 pound note in
4	your pocket and you want to purchase something
5	worth \$10, you hand over the \$20 note and you
6	get \$10 back in change. Similarly, if you have
7	transactions in your wallet a transaction in
8	your wallet that let's say you have a single
9	transaction that somebody has sent you
10	20 bitcoin, for instance, maybe worth \$400,000
11	and you want to send 10 bitcoin somewhere else
12	by car or whatever, you have to send the full
13	amount. You have to send that 20 bitcoin
14	transaction through the blockchain and receive
15	back the 10 bitcoin transaction as change. That
16	receipt back, as I understand it, to the wallet
17	on an exchange would trigger the \$10,000
18	reporting rule and to me would be of absolutely
19	no value to whoever is looking at it.
20	MS. PATEL: Madam Registrar, I am sorry, I should
21	have mentioned, you can take down this document.
22	Thank you very much.
23	Q And the issue with the change transactions is
24	I understand from what you've said is that it's
25	going to result in a large amount of perhaps

1		irrelevant information being submitted to
2		FINTRAC. Is that the issue?
3	А	(PW) Yeah. I would describe it as noise.
4	Q	Okay. Which in turn can obscure information
5		which might actually lead to valuable
6		intelligence?
7	А	(PW) Yeah.
8	Q	Okay. Do any of the other panelists want to
9		weigh in on the fit of the new regulations
10		before I move on?
11	А	(CC) I mean, I think if I could can add to what
12		Peter mentioned. You know, I think it would be
13		helpful for FINTRAC to be clear about this
14		inclusion or exclusion of change transactions
15		because I think there is a wide discrepancy in
16		the industry over whether those are or not part
17		of the large virtual currency transaction
18		report. I do think it is important to note
19		you know, again, I think, as Peter mentioned,
20		the magic number of \$10,000 that was set in
21		place some 30 years ago as a high amount, not
22		necessarily a good fit for cryptocurrency given
23		the price fluctuations as well as the fact
24		that you know, again, I'm just I'm not
25		sure that 10,000 is the magic number anymore.

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1 And there has already been an amount of 2 criticism levied against the reporting 3 requirements for large cash and large wire being of that amount. And it does, I believe, add to 4 5 the noise, as Peter mentioned, in providing, you know, sort of a lot of information in and not 6 sure of the value out of receiving that. 7 Mr. Dixon. 8 9 (GD) I would just add -- yeah, and so we've 10 talked about the foreign money service business requirement previously, but this was something 11 12 which, you know, had come up in some of the 13 round table and consultation that I was part of, 14 which was to say that, you know, arguably 15 there's the requirement of what determines you 16 to be a foreign money service business. One of the criteria related to this is whether you're, 17 18 for example, actively directing or directing --19 I forget if it's -- if actively is in there and 20 in the wording, but somebody directing services 21 to persons within Canada. And, you know, that 22 might be considered -- for example, if you're 23 marketing or advertising to Canadian citizens 24 but your place of business is located outside of Canada, you know, then you would be considered

potentially as a foreign money service business. 1 2 There are other criteria in there, but that 3 is one example and -- which had come up in discussions primarily -- I mean, we're talking 4 5 about the fit with the context of the industry here. And, you know, it's my experience, at 6 least historically, that certainly even, you 7 know, a lot of virtual currency exchanges don't 8 9 typically, you know, advertise in newspapers or 10 sort of, you know, websites advertising their services. So there's a certain challenge here 11 12 which was raised around, you know, is there a loophole here in terms of what would constitute 13 14 a foreign money service business? Could I 15 operate outside of Canada, not be seen to be, 16 quote, sort of actively directing services, but Canadians could be using my platform because I 17 18 don't have a physical place around the world, 19 it's a website, and I could somehow potentially 20 circumvent the regulations in Canada through 21 sort of avoiding that criteria. 22 So there's nuance to that, what I've just 23 described. There's further nuance to that, but 24 it was certainly one of the areas in the consultation over the last couple of years that 25

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Exam by Ms.	Patel	
1		had come up from in the discussions.
2		(CC) I would just add to that too. I think
3		there's several factors that qualify a foreign
4		money service business that can be questioned
5		similarly, as Giles raised, about the one factor
6		of advertising.
7	Q	I just want to clarify one point about the
8		regulations. And I believe one of the panelists
9		mentioned this I think it might have been
10		you, Ms. Cieslik that they apply to virtual
11		currency dealers in virtual currency; they don't
12		apply to transactions between unhosted wallets,
13		wallets of private individuals that are not
14		hosted on an exchange other another platform.
15		Is that right?
16	A	(CC) I think that was Peter that mentioned that.
17		I mean, if I can add to that, Peter. The FATF
18		recommendations were specifically dealing with
19		what they call VASP, virtual asset service
20		providers. I do think there's some challenge
21		country by country as to how each country's laws
22		define who a VASP is and then therefore who this
23		travel rule would apply to. I think there has
24		been an industry-wide and FATF rolled-up

understanding that really this is going to

capture sort of the bigger -- the exchanges, the platforms.

But there have been a lot of questions about how this would impact exchange to private wallet, exchange to, you know, hot wallet service providers that, you know, don't -- I mean, they may fall under the definition of VASP, they may not fall under the definition of VASP depending on the country that they're in.

And that how -- you know, whether an exchange would allow a communication of a transaction between a non-qualified VASP that would be subject to this versus not.

So I think there's a bit of an -- sort of misunderstanding in the crypto -- or about the crypto-industry that it is one thing and it is a VASP and that money only moves between VASPs.

But, you know, you can create your own wallet online every minute of the day if you'd like.

You know, you can have it on a USB key. So those things would not be qualified as a VASP and therefore would not be subject to the rule.

But if you go to a VASP and they ask you for your beneficiary, like, who's on the other side of this? You say, well, it's my hot wallet or

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1		my cold wallet, so it just belongs to me, put in
2		that information. I mean, I think there is a
3		deeper issue and discussion, I don't know if
4		this is the right time for it, but, you know,
5		about validation of the other side of that
6		activity if somebody says that.
7	Q	And, I mean and the rationale I mean, of
8		course there's a regulatory problem. You can't
9		tell everybody who has their own private wallet
10		out there that they have to make reports to
11		FINTRAC when they engage in a transaction. The
12		rationale in targeting VASPs is that at some
13		point somebody who is trying to transfer their
14		virtual asset into fiat currency has to you
15		know, or vice versa has to use an on-ramp or an
16		off-ramp and that's going to be one of these
17		regulated industries. Is that regulated
18		entities. Is that right? Is that the
19		rationale?
20	A	(PW) That might be the rationale. I'm not sure
21		how true in practice it is. You know, you have
22		non-VASPs, local bitcoin one way, you know,
23		can go to somebody in the street and they'll
24		take your crypto and give you cash.

So my next question was flowing from that.

1		We've identified which is what are the gaps
2		in the proceeds of crime, money laundering,
3		terrorist financing regulations that exist even
4		after the further requirements come into effect
5		in June of 2021. One gap is which may or may
6		not be significant is are these unhosted
7		wallets. Are there any others that strike the
8		panelists as being significant?
9	A	(PW) I think if I may comment, I think the
10		capacity of FINTRAC in its current format to,
11		for want of a better word, police VASPs within
12		Canada given the challenges that FINTRAC already
13		faces with its other reporting entities in terms
14		of numbers, et cetera, do they have the capacity
15		to even look at it?
16	Q	So not a gap in the regulation but just a
17		capacity to enforce.
18	A	(PW) Yeah. Yeah.
19		(CC) I do feel there is sort of a gap in
20		maybe interpretation in the regulation. And I
21		would say that, you know, it's not specific to
22		VASP, but it existed in money traditionally
23		service businesses previously. The requirement
24		for completing know your identity verification
25		transactions of a thousand dollars or more

and again I'll just caveat this with -- that
this is for any money service business and now
in virtual asset service providers is how many
under-\$1,000 transactions should you allow in a
day before you believe that somebody is doing
them specifically this way to evade the
know-your-client requirement.

As far as I'm aware -- and I could be wrong, but I feel like I've tried to keep up on it as best I can over the 20 years of my career, is that one platform may say, I don't want you doing more than two a day, where some platforms may decide in their risk-based assessment to say, we don't care how many you do a day as long as they're under a thousand; therefore we don't have to ID anybody.

I think there's some -- you know, some work that may need to be done there, some guidance that may need to be provided there. It does lead to -- I think, you know, we're past the point of debating whether [indiscernible] or not. They are in place, and they -- you know, we are obligated to them. How it's interpreted and operationalized and applied between local, you know, virtual currency dealers, how it's

1		applied or not applied by those who are foreign
2		and operating in Canada, I believe creates a
3		little bit of an uneven playing field with
4		regards to who's got the identity requirements.
5		Now, I like the idea that you don't want to
6		be the lowest point in the floor because it will
7		impact your ability, I think, to get bank
8		accounts and do you know, do other types of
9		things. But I do think there is some elasticity
10		in the application of that.
11	Q	And I would just like to unless I'm
12		interrupting any panel member who was about to
13		jump in on that last question. Okay.
14		I'd just like to confirm that the proceeds
15		of crime regulations that we've just discussed
16		are targeted at AML counterterrorist financing
17		goals, and they don't address issues of customer
18		or investor protection such as an exchange's
19		custody of funds. And is that right?
20	A	(RM) I would say that's correct. And one of the
21		things that I think we maybe I should have
22		jumped in on is the regulations don't
23		necessarily address instances of consumer fraud,
24		be that first-party fraud, where a customer buys
25		a bunch of bitcoin, states they didn't do it and

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their bank is unfriendly to VASPs and allows 1 that chargeback, that malicious chargeback 3 resulting in a loss, or where third-party investment platforms are, you know, duping newbies to crypto, telling them that hey, you can buy bitcoin or buy a share in my bitcoin mining pool. You know, there's all sorts of 7 tried and true fraud typologies that I think are evolving kind of around these regulated VASPs.

> And an additional thing that I think is not addressed is regulation of third-party payment processors which virtually every VASP has to use unless you're lucky enough to have a sponsoring bank, which is getting scarcer and scarcer especially in Canada. So, you know, if you're dealing in cash you have to find an armoured car company that will clear out your ATMs and then wire the cash to you. If you have bank account, great. If you are using another exchange to accept those wires, that's where you're landing and so on, so ...

And I think this is just kind of a broader aspects of what everyone else touched on that the regulations are a great starting point but they don't always bullseye how people are

1	actually using the vehicles and exchanges and so
2	on, so
3	MS. PATEL: Well, that's a great segue into our next
4	topic, which is going to be regulations that are
5	more aimed at consumer investor protection, the
6	role of the securities regulators. But I think
7	that this is probably a good time,
8	Mr. Commissioner, for us to take the break.
9	THE COMMISSIONER: Very well. We will take
10	15 minutes. Thank you.
11	THE REGISTRAR: This hearing is adjourned for a
12	15-minute recess until 11:13 a.m. Please mute
13	your mic and turn off your video. Thank you.
14	(WITNESSES STOOD DOWN)
15	(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 10:59 A.M.)
16	(PROCEEDINGS RECONVENED AT 11:13 A.M.)
17	THE REGISTRAR: Thank you for waiting. The hearing
18	is now resumed. Mr. Commissioner.
19	CHARLENE CIESLIK, for
20	the commission,
21	recalled.
22	GILES DIXON, for the
23	commission, recalled.
24	RYAN MUELLER, for the
25	commission, recalled.

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PETER WARRACK, for the 1 2 commission, recalled. 3 THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Madam Registrar. Yes, Ms. Patel. 4 5 MS. PATEL: Madam Registrar, I'm going to ask you to pull up a document. It's the Ernst & Young 5th 6 report of the monitor respecting Quadriga dated 7 June 19th, 2019. Thank you. And if you could 8 scroll down to page 10. And this is simply to 9 10 give some context to the discussion that I indicated we'd be going into before the break. 11 12 Sorry, not page 10. Paragraph 10, page 6. 13 That's it. Thank you. 14 EXAMINATION BY MS. PATEL: And I -- here the Ontario Securities Commission 15 0 16 report also goes -- relates these findings, but 17 this is a convenient place where they are 18 summarized. And just want to get them out here 19 so that -- to give some context to the 20 discussion we're about to have about what 21 investor or customer protections exist for 22 clients of exchanges. And this just illustrates 23 the problems that can occur in what we hope of 24 course is a worst-case scenario.

So paragraph 10.

1	"The Monitor's preliminary
2	investigation"
3	And, I'm sorry, this is a report of Ernst &
4	Young, the monitor for Quadriga, to the Nova
5	Scotia Supreme Court. And the date of this is
6	June 2019.
7	The Monitor says:
8	"Quadriga's operating infrastructure
9	appears to have been significantly flawed
10	from a financial reporting and operational
11	control perspective. Activities were
12	largely directed by a single
13	individual and as a result, typical
14	segregation of duties and basic internal
15	controls did not appear to exist."
16	(B):
17	"No accounting records have been
18	identified by the Monitor and there
19	appears to have been no segregation of
20	assets between Quadriga Funds and User
21	Funds."
22	I'll go down to the next paragraph.
23	"The Company appears to have engaged in
24	significant 'cash' transactions. The
25	Monitor has been unable to verify if cash

1	deposits were deposited into accounts
2	containing User Funds or properly
3	recorded."
4	And down to (d):
5	"The Monitor has been unable to locate
6	basic corporate records including the
7	location and security passwords associated
8	with Quadriga's Fiat and Cryptocurrency
9	inventories between TPP"
10	Third-part payment processors, I understand.
11	" bank accounts, wallet addresses and
12	third-party exchanges. In addition, the
13	Monitor understands passwords were held by
14	a single individual, Mr. Cotten, and it
15	appears that Quadriga failed to ensure
16	adequate safeguard procedures were in
17	place to transfer passwords and other
18	critical operating data to other Quadriga
19	representatives "
20	Going down to (e):
21	"The Company relied extensively upon the
22	services of TPPs"
23	Third-party payment processors.
24	" to administer its fiat treasury
25	functions."

1	Mr. Mueller, this is an issue that you just
2	raised before the break, and we will get back to
3	this. I'm just noting it here. (F):
4	"User Cryptocurrency was not maintained
5	exclusively in Quadriga'S hot and cold
6	wallets. Significant volumes of
7	Cryptocurrency were transferred off
8	Platform outside Quadriga to competitor
9	exchanges into personal accounts
10	controlled by Mr. Cotten."
11	Down to (g):
12	"Mr. Cotten created Identified Accounts
13	under aliases where it appears that
14	Unsupported Deposits were deposited and
15	used to trade within the Platform
16	resulting in inflated revenue figures,
17	artificial trades with Users and
18	ultimately the withdrawal of
19	Cryptocurrency deposited by Users."
20	And finally (h):
21	"Substantial Funds were transferred to
22	Mr. Cotten personally and other related
23	parties. The Monitor has not located any
24	support justifying these transfers."
25	So the Ontario Securities Commission overview

1	that we looked at previously described the fact
2	that there were 76,000 users who lost their
3	funds in amounts from after the trustee was
4	able to recover some in an amount of
5	\$169 million. And this overview gives us a
6	little insight into why that was, and I put that
7	out there. None of you, I know, were involved
8	as far well, as far as I know, in this
9	particular work, but just to give some context
10	to our discussion.
11	MS. PATEL: And, Madam Registrar, if we could mark
12	Mr. Commissioner, if we could have this marked
13	as the next exhibit, and then it can be taken
14	down.
15	THE COMMISSIONER: 266, I think, Madam Registrar.
16	THE REGISTRAR: Yes, exhibit 266.
17	MR. COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
18	EXHIBIT 266: Fifth Report of the Monitor -
19	June 19, 2019
20	MS. PATEL:
21	Q All right. So that is a nightmarish report of
22	the internal operations of an exchange that a
23	customer might read, you know, having deposited
24	their funds or their virtual currencies there,
25	would be very distressed to read about those

1		that lack of internal operational control and
2		the things that happened there. And my this
3		is a segue into a discussion about what
4		regulations and oversight exist currently that
5		could have prevented this what regulatory
6		framework exists that can address these kinds of
7		failings. And I'm going to I think address this
8		first to Mr. Dixon.
9	A	(GD) Sure. Thank you. Yeah, I think the
10		framework and the sort of set of standards that
11		most immediately comes to mind which is very
12		common in, let's say, quote/unquote, more
13		traditional financial institutions or
14		non-cryptocurrency world relates to, -for
15		example, it's quite common in the fiat world,
16		the non-crypto-world for firms who are, let's
17		say, custodying users assets to engage in
18		independent audit of how they manage the custody
19		of their customer's funds.
20		And typically the frameworks that are used
21		to undertake that assessment and provide an
22		opinion on those things are what we call system
23		and organization control audits or reports.
24		These are standards which are set in the US by
25		the American Institute of Certified Public

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Accountants in Canada, the Canadian standard on 1 2 insurance engagements, and they are audits. 3 They are reports which have presented primarily 4 to, let's say, the management of a firm to give 5 an independent opinion on risk associated with this type of thing. And it could be the --6 7 providing an opinion depending on the type of audit, and there are various different types 8 which I'm happy to talk to. 9 10 One of them will focus in on, for example, financial controls within an organization. 11 would be titled a SOC 1 report there is a SOC 2 12 13 report, which focuses in more on the efficacy of 14 the system-based controls in an organization. And then underneath those SOC 1, SOC 2 there are 15 16 other kind of subtypes depending on the anticipated audience of the report that's 17 18 required. But effectively at a high level what 19 they get at is it's having an independent third 20 party come in and attest to the effectiveness of 21 controls, whether they be financial or systems 22 based. 23 This is a very common standard in which, you

know, non-crypto-based financial institutions

who are custodying assets will commonly hold

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themselves to. And in some cases there is a 1 2 third type of report, a SOC 3. And let me know 3 if I'm going into too much detail, here, but --4 which is presented as a public-facing report 5 which are sometimes used to not just assure the 6 management, the internal individuals in an 7 organization who control the company, of the efficacy of those controls, but also the public 8 9 at large. 10 So that to me is the most common sort of set -- or the most immediately relevant, I would 11 12 say, set of standards and frameworks which could 13 apply here. And it is fair to say in some 14 scenario -- in certain circumstances now, 15 particularly in the United States, we are seeing VASPs and dealings in virtual currency going 16 down this route of independent SOC reports for 17 18 just this reason. Because from a consumer 19 protection point of view what those audits 20 attempt to get at, as we've described, is how 21 these organizations are -- what controls, what 22 governance do they have in place around the 23 custody of their users' funds. And it gets --24 there's a whole bunch of detail that it can

go -- that we can go into on it, but effectively

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1		it sets out what the controls should look like,
2		what good practice looks like and whether the
3		company is operating against those best
4		practices.
5		So that's where my mind immediately goes in
6		term of a potential set of standards that could
7		help with this type of thing.
8	Q	And you say "potential". There is no legal
9		requirement currently on exchanges to engage in
10		this kind of audit and control process?
11	А	(GD) I'd need to double-check that. I do
12		know I mean, for example, if we I was
13		reading the joint CSA/IIROC consultant paper
14		that was drafted in March 14, 2019, and they
15		actually suggested this as a potential, you
16		know, solution to some of these issues that
17		we've been seeing and they make reference to the
18		fact that, you know, traditional custodians that
19		hold assets for clients, they will the
20		wording is typically engage an internal an
21		independent auditor.
22		I'd have to double-check whether it's a
23		legal requirement, but certainly I think from
24		for example, from the CSA point of view that it

is often a requirement at their level for an

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Q

organization coming in to be a registered dealer
and so on. There will be certain requirements
related to that which may come from that side of
things. Yeah.
Q There could be a requirement under securities
laws.
MS. PATEL: And actually I'm going to ask Madam
Registrar to bring up that document you just
mentioned, the joint CSA/IIROC consultation
paper at 21402. And that is an appendix to an
overview report, Madam Registrar, overview
report that is exhibit 247. And I'm just going
to pull the and I think what I'm looking
for
THE REGISTRAR: Yes. Which appendix are you looking
for?
MS. PATEL: It is appendix D. At page 32 of the PDF
is where I'd like you to go. Okay. Actually,
if we could just scroll up slightly. Oh, sorry.
THE REGISTRAR: Is it this page?
MS. PATEL: It's at appendix D. Yeah. So if you go
to page 30 of the PDF. And actually if you
could just scroll up to the title page. Down a
bit further. Yeah.

So I'm just identifying this document as the

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1	,	Joint CSA/IIROC Industry Paper on a Proposed
2	I	Framework For Crypto-Asset Trading Platforms."
3	I	And that's what you've been discussing,
4	N	Mr. Dixon? Okay.
5	A	(GD) Correct.
6	MS. PA	ATEL: And I'll just and, Madam Registrar, if
7	7	you could scroll forward to this is, I
8	ι	understand, a paper that contemplates a
9	f	framework, a regulatory securities framework for
10	7	virtual currency platforms; is that right?
11	N	Mr. Dixon, is that your understanding?
12	Α (	(GD) My understanding is this is a proposed
13	f	Framework, yeah.
14	Q I	And so at page 32 of the PDF. Yeah. There's
15	Ī	part 3 down there, if you could scroll, they set
16	C	out risks related to platforms. I don't need to
17	Š	go through those. They largely they echo the
18	f	findings of the Ontario Securities Commission
19	V	with respect to Quadriga, the monitor's report
20	t	that we just went to.
21		And just what I do want to go to is on
22	Ī	page 39 of the PDF. And here where the
23	Ī	paragraph that says:
24		"We understand, however, that there have

been challenges with crypto asset

1		custodians and platforms obtaining SOC 2,
2		Type II Reports, in part due to the novel
3		nature of crypto asset custody solutions
4		and the limited period of time that
5		Platforms have been in operation to allow
6		for the testing of internal controls."
7		So I just in reference to the comment that
8		you just made, it seems like it would be a
9		wonderful thing for exchanges to engage in this
10		kind of audit, but is there a further issue
11		and we'll get into other service provision
12		problems that crypto-businesses face with
13		even getting this kind of audit?
14	A	(GD) Is that directed to me?
15	Q	Yes. Yeah. Would you agree with this
16		conclusion, there's challenges with getting such
17		an audit?
18	A	(GD) I would agree that there are several
19		challenges, yeah.
20	Q	Yeah. Ms. Cieslik, have you had experience with
21		that yourself?
22	A	(CC) Yes, I have had direct experience with
23		that. In some of my prior work experiences,
24		while not an official legislative requirement
25		and well prior to this prosed platform

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mentioned -- I think -- I mean, I think I'd like 1 2 to also just point out that as FINTRAC and the 3 Department of Finance are defining those who deal in virtual currencies as money service 4 businesses, this prosed framework adds an 5 additional challenge of defining them 6 alternatively based on some certain factors that 7 are not addressed under the Proceeds of Crime 8 9 Act. So not every person who deals in virtual 10 currency would necessarily be subject to having to register as a securities broker/dealer and 11 12 therefore be subject to these requirements. 13 But in my past experience there were times, 14 A, we couldn't find qualified auditors who had 15 the skills and capabilities to complete these 16 kinds of audits. Secondly, there was, if I 17 recall correctly, a stance taken by some central 18 audit standards bodies for the firms to not 19 complete these audits due to that fact -- due to 20 that and as well as other factors as is the 21 liability of asserting on an audit of something, 22 though not understanding necessarily yet all that was needed to understand in order to make 23

such an audit-level opinion, prevented them from

continuing an audit.

1		So while an audit may have begun, the
2		auditors were pulled and not permitted to
3		complete the audit until some further clarity
4		was provided by that central body. And forgive
5		me, I don't I'm not familiar with where that
6		landed, if that was resolved appropriately.
7		Possibly Giles knows something about that I
8		don't. But, you know, that people were either
9		unwilling or unable or prevented from completing
10		these audits for an exchange.
11	Q	Mr. Dixon, is there any response you'd like to
12		make to that?
13	А	(GD) It's so that is certainly one of the
14		I would say there's a smaller list of
15		challenges, and that's a big one. I'm not an
16		auditor myself. I work with colleagues who are
17		auditors, and so I have some exposure to some of
18		these challenges that my panelist has been
19		referring to.
20		But yes, the audit landscape is much like
21		the AML regulatory landscape is growing in
22		regards to cryptocurrency. It's much like the
23		PCMLTFA and some of the challenges we've spoken
24		about. There are interpretation issues and
25		challenges for us I use the term broadly

as auditors in how some of those standards apply to, you know, the still relatively new world of virtual currency. So it makes it a challenge from a risk perspective for a professional services organization to deliver public opinions when there is still, you know, for example a lack of guidance or ambiguity in interpretation of how the current audit standards apply to the virtual currency world. So for sure that's a challenge.

I believe Charlene -- it was the CPAB, the Canadian Public Accountability Board who had issued some -- to my understanding it wasn't statements that said that auditors could not undertake audits, but the requirements that were set from the -- that body made it, let's say, very difficult to -- you know, to -- but we're certainly seeing, as time goes on, professional services firm becoming slowly more comfortable in issuing opinions to the virtual currency industry.

If I may, I could mention a couple of other of the challenges because that is, I think, one of them, but there are other, you know, broader challenges, so I'm happy to speak to those if

1 you would like.

Q I think probably it's a good opportunity to, yeah, jump into that.

A (GD) Sure. So, you know, some of these challenges are actually quite linked to some of the things we have spoken about and what we probably will talk about. So we've talked about, you know, the regulatory guidance and whether there is still some ambiguity on how, say, current standards apply to the audit world in order to allow for those types of services to be provided. As the CSA report notes, however, the sort of relatively nascent stage of the industry has resulted, in terms of what I've seen, in certain of these funds and perhaps not being ready themselves to receive an audit of this kind.

And so, for example -- to give you just a very high level example. My understanding is if a company is requesting, say, a SOC 2 report -- and just to remind us that is related to attesting to the efficacy of system-based controls. And that would very much relate, for example, to how crypto-assets are governed and handled within a virtual currency exchange. You

know, one basic requirement as an auditor coming in to assess those controls is that those controls are documented and are able to be audited. And, you know, that is often a challenge in, let's say, less mature, newer dealers in virtual currency who, you know, rightly so in some respect have had to focus on the commercial side of the business and get that up and running. But it presents challenges to external parties to actually come in and undertake the work, if they could, in the first place.

There are even some other overlapping challenges related to some of the banking challenges, which I'm sure we'll get onto at some point, and, you know, independence issues that stem from that. And we've seen certain groups who, you know, for example, have a large holding in a particular bank and puts into challenge some of the independence and how much we can rely on the data that we need to be auditing in the first place. And then of course the cost of doing this type of work can be prohibitive for some as well, so there's a challenge there too.

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1		So I would say they're multifaceted
2		challenges and often overlapping.
3	Q	I'd just like to note, and this a bit of a
4		way of an evidentiary shorthand here. At the
5		back of the report we were just we've just
6		been looking at oh, it's still there. At
7		appendix B and, Madam Registrar, you don't
8		need to go there. I'm just noting this for the
9		record. At appendix B and appendix C of that
10		report the authors have very helpfully set out a
11		summary of regulatory requirement that are
12		applicable under appendix B to marketplaces and,
13		under appendix C, applicable to dealers. So
14		that's just put a note there of a good
15		shorthand reference to what regulatory
16		requirements would apply to entities registering
17		under securities legislation as in various
18		capacities.
19		And with that I'd like to turn to
20		Mr. Mueller, you know, Netcoins is currently
21		undergoing the process of applying for
22		registration with the BC Securities Commission;
23		is that right?
24	A	(RM) That's correct.

Are you aware of any other virtual currency

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1		platforms that are engaged in the same process?
2	А	(RM) I've heard that Bitvo is looking at Alberta
3		securities registration, but I haven't seen any
4		documents, so that's hearsay.
5	Q	Are there any platforms that are currently
6		registered?
7	Α	(RM) I don't believe so. Maybe Wealthsimple,
8		but Wealthsimple, you can't move crypto on and
9		off their platform, so I'm not sure that it is a
10		direct analogue.
11	Q	Okay.
12	A	(CC) Wealthsimple, I believe, is operating under
13		their exempt market dealer licence. An
14		announcement has recently come out on Business
15		Wire that Coinsquare, under new leadership, has
16		submitted their application for their
17		broker-dealer licence with the OSC.
18	Q	Thank you. Mr. Mueller, is it your
19		understanding that Netcoins is required to
20		register with the BC Securities Commission?
21	А	(RM) There is no requirement. We're undergoing
22		a voluntary registration.
23	Q	Okay. And in the context of the discussion
24		we've just had, Mr. Dixon raised the you

know, one of the barriers to getting additional

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1		oversight is the cost of such endeavours. Why
Τ		oversignt is the cost of such endeavours. Why
2		voluntarily take this up from Netcoins'
3		perspective?
4	A	(RM) I believe that we would like to I mean,
5		the cryptomarket is growing. There's certainly
6		more and more newbie users. There's more volume
7		there and more established guys are not looking
8		for a new platform. Newbies are looking for a
9		safe platform. So I think what we want to do is
10		establish that, you know, we're undergoing this
11		registration and we're abiding by these
12		regulations to attract those new users.
13	Q	So in effect your view is that the additional
14		regulatory expense is going to be justified by
15		the value to the customer the perceived value
16		to the customer base in terms of stability and
17		assurance provided by regulation?
18	А	(RM) That's certainly one factor, yes.
19	MS.	PATEL: Okay. I'd like to turn now, and I'm
20		Mr. Commissioner, just so you know, I'm hoping
21		to the turn the floor over to my colleagues who
22		do have questions of that panel at noon, and so
23		I'm going to move rapid fire through my
24		remaining topics.

And one thing we've touched on several times,

1		and I want to get at it directly now, is the
2		issue and this is has been raised by other
3		witnesses this week, the issue of virtual
4		currency businesses accessing banking services.
5		And I we've heard evidence that these
6		services have difficulty in accessing banking
7		services. We could see that again in the
8		Ontario Securities Commission report regarding
9		Quadriga. They had and then lost banking
10		services.
11		So my question is I'll ask maybe
12		Ms. Cieslik, you've had some experience in this
13		area, I know. First of all, if you can confirm
14		that this is true, and then say why it is the
15		case from your understanding. Obviously you
16		can't tell us what the banks are thinking
17		exactly.
18	А	(CC) Absolutely. I mean, my original foray in
19		leaving traditional finance and getting into
20		cryptocurrency I believe was very largely
21		predicated on the fact of difficulty in
22		achieving getting a big 4 or big 5 Canadian
23		bank account to accept a cryptocurrency
24		exchange. So at the time in 2018 there were no
25		rules for cryptocurrencies to be registered with

about the time, again, like, people were

starting to and expecting, you know, movement

happen in that area. And as I mentioned, my

prior employer had been successful in

registering prior to any inclusion of virtual

assets being part of the MSB definition.

You know, in the early days of course getting bank accounts was achieved through probably less than transparent methods. So banks were not at all happy with people using their accounts for crypto-services when they found out and started closing all of their accounts.

Now, I will say I experienced a similar response approximately 10 or 12 years ago working with traditional money services businesses being -- the common phrase is demarketed. So banks had decided the risk of dealing with those type of entities was too high and they would no longer provide them access to the banking system. A big part of my role then was helping them build up and solidify their anti-money laundering programs and going back to the bank, you know, hat in hand saying, hey,

we've had this 20-year relationship with you where you were okay with us and suddenly you decided to kick us out; here's all the work and effort we've done to shore up what we have -- you know, what our compliance regime looks like from the anti-money laundering perspective and please give us a bank account back. So I feel like this is a bit of a repeat of that with a new industry.

Certainly the headlines, such as the one we referenced with Quadriga among other -- and I don't know if we'll address that further on, but initial coin offering-type scams and schemes has given this negative -- you know, negative pallor on cryptocurrency.

So generally what I have found is that banks', you know, risk-based decisions have included decisions to no longer provide services or a refusal to provide services to anyone who deals in virtual assets and how that has sort of evolved or changed over the last few years. I mean, certainly I'll say one of the feathers in my caps was getting what we were told at the time was the first transparent bank account for cryptocurrency exchange in Canada with a big 4

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bank with their full awareness and cooperation
after jumping through several hoops. Happy to
jump through those hoops. However, taking on
sort of the risk expectations of the financial
institution in instilling them in the
cryptocurrency service themselves in order to
achieve that access.

So it was quite -- you know, sort of a tenuous time of will we or won't we be able to service our customers as we don't have access to that fiat on-ramp and off-ramp, as variously had been referred to throughout this morning, or afternoon in the eastern side. That they really -- you know, financial institutions hold the key to being able to do this and without them your business is at a very significant disadvantage in order to serve clients as well as support your own business with your own operating accounts. So things like being able to make payroll, buy, you know, computers, everything that you need to run your business. I mean, the need for banking services, it seems clear enough. You were working at an entity that was fortunate enough to be able to have

your persuasive powers to get banking services

from a traditional bank. What are the options 1 2 for businesses that cannot get banking services 3 at all? (CC) Sure. I mean, I think there was a period 4 Α of time where there were people looking into --5 like the financial institution that we were able 6 7 to work with in my past role that were open to hearing about, you know, what we're making in 8 9 terms of efforts towards compliance so that it 10 started to open up a little bit. But that's variously sort of waxed and waned over time. 11 12 Some people have met their threshold to say, we 13 will no longer; like, we've taken a few, but 14 it's -- our risk appetite is this and we don't 15 want to expand this offering to a greater group 16 of cryptos. 17 So -- and prior to this and also subsequent 18 to this any dealers in virtual currency -- and 19 certainly has been my experience not only 20 working with them but providing services to them 21 is that without access to big 4, big 5, you 22 know, banking services locally, they have two 23 options really. They use payment service 24 providers. You know, as I think one of the other panelists had mentioned, you know, it sort 25

1		of puts a wall between the crypto-asset company
2		and the bank itself because they're going
3		through a third-party payment processor.
4		Obviously some less you know, sort of
5		less proper methods of not revealing who you are
6		to your financial institutions. And that
7		certainly happened previously and I'm sure
8		continues today. You know, and in terms of
9		payment service providers, whether it uses sort
10		of a domestic payment service provider that is
11		Canadian or you may be using offshore payment
12		providers who have less stringent or less strict
13		concerns about regulatory status, and then also
14		even using offshore financial institutions
15		willing to provide sort of banking services
16		under those same criteria.
17	Q	And I'm going to Mr. Mueller, you've got a
18		background in payment processors; is that
19		that's right?
20	А	(RM) That's correct.
21	Q	And so I'm going to direct these questions
22		this question at you, which is what is the
23		problem with using a payment processor from the
24		perspective of anti-money laundering concerns?
25	A	(RM) Sure. So I think the simplest way to

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explain it is if I'm a Canadian VASP and I 1 2 receive over \$10,000 in a wire from an offshore 3 customer, I'm required to report that and so is my domestic bank. Where if I'm using, let's 4 5 say, a pseudobanking product like an IBAN which functions just like a bank account but like a 6 sub kind of account from, say, a European 7 provider, my financial institution is it never 8 9 going to file a report with FINTRAC about that 10 transaction. And since it didn't enter or leave Canada, I'm technically not required to report 11 12 it either. 13 So if I'm trying to do my best, I might 14 submit a VIR, a volunteer information report, 15 but you know, if I'm on the ropes and only three 16 people work here and I have an offshore account 17 that VIR may never be reported. 18 problematic transaction that for all intents and 19 purposes may have been fulfilled in Canada and 20 taken place on Canadian servers would not be 21 reported to the financial institution -- or 22 financial intelligence unit. 23 Q Are Canadian payment processors required to 24 report to FINTRAC?

(RM) So that is actually a pretty grey area.

1		technically you have to register as an MSB if
2		you are remitting funds, but, you know, if you
3		are a payment processors, there's no clear
4		designation that payment processing activities
5		fall under MSB. And there's been a lot of talk
6		about introducing analogues to what the UK does
7		with the Financial Conduct Authority to regulate
8		payment service providers in Canada, but that
9		hasn't really come to fruition yet. So, for
10		example, like, if you look at Paysafe, one of
11		the largest Canadian payment processors kind of
12		ever, I'm not sure that they have a current MSB
13		registration.
14	Q	So if I can summarize in short, one of the AML
15		risks of VASPs not having access to banking
16		services is that it creates a bit of a black box
17		from FINTRAC's perspective when it comes to
18		reporting transactions?
19	A	(RM) Certainly. It makes the flow of funds
20		opaque.
21	Q	Okay. I'm going to move very briefly
22		Ms. Cieslik, I just I want to give you an
23		opportunity to respond to some evidence that
24		we've heard earlier this week with respect to
25		the money laundering risks of kiosks or bit

1	ATMs. We've heard evidence from an RCMP panel
2	that they are they can be used as a
3	facilitator for money laundering. What and
4	as somebody who's got current experience and
5	past experience in the industry dealing with bit
6	ATM companies, do you have a response to this
7	perception of these kiosks, bit ATMs, being
8	particularly vulnerable to money laundering?
9	MS. PATEL: And, Madam Registrar, you can take down
10	the document. Thank you very much.
11	THE WITNESS: (CC) Yes, absolutely I can respond to
12	that. I mean, I think you had asked earlier in
13	today's testimony about, you know, perception
14	and vulnerabilities in this field. And, you
15	know, cryptocurrency we are talking about
16	broadly, a lot of talk about exchanges and
17	trading platforms and now we're moving sort of
18	to the bit ATM, as I call them. Kiosks, as they
19	were referred to.
20	You know, I certainly can't deny there is a
21	vulnerability. Where there's an opportunity for
22	an exploitation, a criminal element will exploit
23	it. And we you know, we've seen that happen
24	in the traditional financial services space.
25	And, you know, I don't think that sort of is

anything new. You know, with the emergence of crypto, it was an unregulated industry. Fraud and money laundering and illegal activity was -- part of it, I think, certainly was displaced from that into crypto because of certain factors. Ease of use, maybe lower fees in some instances.

So when it comes to, you know, bit ATMs specifically, obviously the way that they work, they will take cash from a person and provide a cryptocurrency purchase to them. I think the fact that they have been used or exploited by criminal elements does not necessarily mean that the bit ATM companies want this or encourage it. They are looking and always actively seeking ways to mitigate it, and in fact they would be considered victims too in this instance.

And certainly, again, I can't deny in the earlier days of bit ATM companies where there was no regulation or there were no limits and there were no sort of monitoring and oversight of them that some maybe have acted without limits without monitoring. I think that much like the rest of the crypto-industry, that that sort of funnel has gotten smaller as these rules

1		come into effects and they do definitely apply
2		to the bit ATM machine companies. They are cash
3		based, which remains is and remains a
4		high-risk product for money laundering, both,
5		again, in traditional and crypto-environments.
6		But, again, I do think the introduction of
7		the recent, you know, amendments to rules will
8		disrupt this ability for criminals to exploit
9		this area in the same fashion that they have,
10		you know, with any other entity that has
11		previously not been under FINTRAC law and has
12		come under FINTRAC law.
13	Q	And I'll ask you directly, I mean, given the
14		ability to go online and connect a bank account
15		or a credit card to a platform where you could
16		purchase, you know, bitcoin or any other virtual
17		currency, what is the what's the valid use
18		case for a bit ATM in a world where you can
19		engage in those transaction, you know, directly
20		through your bank as opposed to through cash?
21	A	(CC) Sure. I mean, I think we always have to
22		remember that there is an economy of there is
23		a group of people that are cash based and
24		continue to operate cash based. I mean, I
25		definitely think the rules around cash movements

and controls have limited that, but, you know, I

wouldn't want to discount that there's still an

amount of people that operate in cash. Not all

of them are criminals.

You know, a bit ATM machine provides an instant sort of on-ramp of fiat to crypto for smaller scale transactions and provides an instant delivery of virtual currency. So there is no reliance on a third party to hold your assets for you, that you are instantly delivered what you are purchasing, like buying a chocolate bar, so to speak.

I think another use case for virtual ATM machines which are also -- you know, it's a good and bad, I suppose, is that with some of the frauds and explosions of things like Quadriga, people have become increasingly concerned about sharing their personal information. So when you sign onto a platform and you're subject to identity verification requirements based on the opening of an account, you're required to provide your identity documents, potentially a proof of address document. Potentially, you know, in some countries you're required to provide social insurance -- social security

1		number. And where you might have concerns over
2		safety and security of both your personal
3		information and your assets, you might just want
4		to be taking that chocolate bar with you when
5		you buy it as opposed to leaving it at the store
6		and going to visit it later when you want a bite
7		of it.
8		And so I think it's a low barrier of entry
9		for those who wish to get into the market. And
10		I do think that there is a misconception that
11		someone can stand at a machine and enter
12		hundreds of thousands of dollars of bills to do
13		this these purchases at bit ATMs.
14	Q	And just I just want to make sure it's clear.
15		You did mention that bit ATMs are MSBs under the
16		new regs?
17	A	(CC) Yes, they are.
18	Q	Right. And they're subject to the same at a
19		certain threshold deposits there are subject to
20		the same identification know-your-client
21		requirements as other MSBs; is that right?
22	А	(CC) Yes. Yeah. I mean, that is the
23		requirement that's sort of staggered to come
24		into effect early sort of next year, mid next
25		year. But there are you know, the FATF has

1	released guidance, and this has been common in
2	the traditional money service, that certain
3	transactions under certain dollar values are
4	considered low risk and therefore not subject to
5	KYC but that that dollar amount here in Canada
6	is a thousand dollars. So if you do a single
7	transaction of a thousand dollars or more that
8	you would be subject to that same identity
9	verification.
10	MS. PATEL: The City of Vancouver recently staff
11	sent a memo to mayor and council addressing
12	certain money laundering concerns. And I'll
13	just I'll ask Madam Registrar to put it up,
14	the City of Vancouver staff memo dated
15	October 30th, 2020. And if you can just, Madam
16	Registrar, scroll down to page 5. Staff let
17	me check my reference. Sorry.
18	At page 4 of the document, page 4 of 12.
19	Staff is directed to consider the powers
20	available under the Vancouver charter including
21	but not limited to and here (iii):
22	"The creation of by-laws to regulate the
23	use and operation of cryptocurrency ATMs,
24	including the requirement for a business
25	license"

1		And I'll just stop there and get to the
2		punchline on page 5. Madam Registrar, if you
3		scroll down.
4		At the bottom of page 5 it's the title
5		"Preferred Licensing Approach." And staff
6		concludes here that:
7		"The preferred licensing approach is to
8		continue to permit the operation of
9		cryptocurrency ATMs in the City and to
10		address potential concerns with fraudulent
11		activities by regulating them using
12		existing by-laws, including adding a
13		self-declaration about compliance with
14		FinTRAC, and to gather data through the
15		business licensing data base to report
16		out as needed. Implementation could begin
17		immediately."
18	Q	Now, do you have any response, Ms. Cieslik, to
19		the suggestion that bit ATMs should be regulated
20		in this manner by municipal governments, the
21		City of Vancouver in this instance? In
22		particular will it do anything to address money
23		laundering concerns?
24	А	(CC) Well, I mean, it seems, in reading this
25		prior to the testimony today, is that this is

largely driven by, you know, a concern over
fraud maybe necessarily above or primarily
instead of money laundering. I'm not really
sure what drove this determination or how they
came to this assessment that bit ATMs were a
risk necessary to -- you know, necessary for
specific additional requirements.

Now, with the new laws that have come into effect in June at the federal level, I do see that some suggestions in here do go above and beyond the requirements for domestic, you know, money service business registration, including, you know, gathering information about the ownership, et cetera, that, you know, is not necessarily completed by FINTRAC for a local money service business.

You know, I can't deny that having some additional information would certainly aid law enforcement when there was a case or if there was a concern pertaining to a bit ATM company that there would be some thing that is FINTRAC is not covering that would be covered by a local licence.

The self-declaration aspect, you know, I don't think -- you know, FINTRAC itself doesn't

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1	generally take self-declarations of anything.
2	So saying, you know, I swear, officer, I'm not,
3	you know, laundering any money here is similar
4	to, you know, I swear I'm complying with all
5	FINTRAC requirements. You know, I would be sort
6	of more interested in seeing a real oversight
7	and supervisory capacity of FINTRAC being
8	increased to be able to provide that kind of
9	assurance as opposed to relying on a
10	self-declaration which is not verifiable,
11	generally.
12	But, you know, again, I do go back to, you
13	know, the impetus of such a memo and why
14	specifically bit ATMs were singled out in the
15	group of what cryptocurrency offerings are
16	available to residents of Vancouver or Canada at
17	large that would say that this in particular
18	would require this additional step that isn't
19	covered necessarily by the new federal-level
20	rules.
21	MS. PATEL: And unfortunately we don't have time to
22	get into further exploration of that, but thanks
23	for your response on that.
24	And if we could this have I'd ask that be

marked as the next exhibit, please. And, Madam

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1		Registrar, you can take down this document.
2	THE (	COMMISSIONER: Very well. Thank you.
3		EXHIBIT 267: City of Vancouver Memo to mayor
4		re: Bitcoin ATMS - October 30, 2020
5	MS. I	PATEL:
6	Q	And then finally my final group of questions
7		is directed in particular to Mr. Warrack. I'd
8		like to ask you about a couple of industry
9		and well, partnerships with respect to one
10		is specific to virtual currencies and virtual
11		currency service virtual asset service
12		providers. That's Project Participate. And
13		then if time allows, I'll ask you about the
14		other one, Project Protect. But if I could ask
15		you, Mr. Warrack, if could you describe what
16		Project Participate is. And you're on mute.
17	A	(PW) Yeah, Project Participate started in 2018
18		by myself with my appointment as Chief
19		Compliance Officer to the cryptocurrency trading
20		platform. And I wasn't aware that FATF were
21		going to be publishing guidance around
22		cryptocurrency and exchanges, et cetera, and
23		that guidance would include red flags and
24		suspicion and encouragement to report suspicious

activity by exchanges, et cetera. When I looked

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1	at the guidance that actually came out from the
2	FATF in 2019, it struck me that whilst the
3	recommendation was that exchanges should report
4	suspicious activity, there's no information as
5	to what constituted suspicious activity. It was
6	kind of up to the exchange to guess, if you
7	will, about what that meant.
8	So I basically reached out to peers in the
9	industry, both in Canada but more
10	internationally, including other exchanges,
11	software providers such as Chainalysis,
12	et cetera. And we came together with our own
13	list of red flags, suspicions as we called them,
14	based on our own experiences. We also consulted
15	with law enforcement internationally, including
16	Europol, and basically published a report called
17	Project Participate which was sent to the FATF
18	and I know had a large part in the what
19	became the FATF report September of this year.
20	It had a large input into that.
21	And the indicators of suspicion were
22	designed to inform the design of transaction
23	monitoring programs in an exchange, for
24	instance, what to look for that's suspicious but

also investigative behaviour by exchanges and by

1		law enforcement, et cetera.
2		So it was that collaboration. More recently
3		and it was very informal. It was very, very
4		informal. Just people just getting together
5		to do the right thing and share their indicators
6		with each other.
7		More recently, the project is still going on
8		a more limited scale, certainly in Canada, with
9		collaboration with the RCMP and other law
10		enforcement agencies and some of the banks in
11		terms of shared best practice as it relates to
12		cryptocurrency investigation.
13	Q	As a result of this collaboration that you've
14		just described, you published a document called
15		"Indicators of Suspicion For Virtual Asset
16		Service Providers." Is that right?
17	А	(PW) That's correct.
18	Q	And the FATF document that you were just
19		referring to is the September 2020 "Red Flag
20		Indicators Money Laundering and Terrorist
21		Financing For Virtual Asset Service Providers"?
22	А	(PW) That's correct, yeah.
23	Q	Which is a similar but a shorter document but
24		highlights many of the same red flag indicators.

Would you say that's fair?

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1	А	(PW) Yeah, I'd like to think that the FATF took
2		the best of the Project Participate and
3		incorporated it in their document. And I do
4		know for a fact that Canada was represented
5		on with FATF on this project by FINTRAC and
6		Participate did form a large part of that,
7		formation of the document.
8	Q	Are you aware of any similar industry endeavours
9		in other areas, for example, in traditional
10		banking, in other groups of reporting entities,
11		say, [indiscernible] this kind of work.
12	А	(PW) Certainly within yeah, certainly
13		there are many, but within Canada certainly, you
14		know, things like Project Protect, which you
15		mentioned and subprojects that came out of that
16		where the private sector and industry have got
17		together and do get together to share best
18		practice to discuss the interpretive guidance
19		and in some cases result in changes to that.
20		And this is a fairly recent phenomenon.
21		Prior to 2015 it was kind of unheard of. The
22		regulated entities and the regulator, whether it
23		be FINTRAC or OSFI, kind of didn't talk to each
24		other informally. It a very, very formal
25		relationship and not discuss it.

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Throughout the evidence we've heard today 1 0 2 there's been several references to or 3 discussions of industry stepping in and --4 stepping in and taking up kind of the burden in 5 the regulatory space, whether it's -- whether we're talking about education of regulators, the 6 implementation of standards before regulation is 7 in force, the development of technologies to 8 9 allow regulations to be effected. We referred 10 to that when we spoke of the travel rule. we've had another example of the industry 11 12 stepping forward and creating this document through Project Participate, the indicators of 13 14 suspicion, to allow industry to know how to meet 15 its AML compliance. 16 And maybe this -- do any -- you might have a 17 different answer here, this panel, than maybe a 18 regulator or government would have. Do any 19 concerns arise that the AML regulation of this 20 industry has been very much -- and you can take 21 issue with that characterization -- very much 22 driven by industry itself? 23 Α (PW) I don't believe so. I believe, you know, 24 in more recent years since 2016 and Project

Protect in particular, which was the first, the

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1		regulators are still in charge, but there's a
2		realization that we all have a role to play.
3		And I think this also coincided with FINTRAC's
4		change of strategy at the time where beforehand
5		it was a very checklist approach to compliance.
6		You know, you check all these boxes, a bank is
7		or isn't doing what the rules say, now to
8		their strategy is one of compliance for
9		intelligence, intelligence for law enforcement.
10		And how a bank, for instance, is performing in
11		terms of its AML function, it's measured in
12		terms of effectiveness, not checklist points.
13	Q	Do any of the other panel members want to
14		respond to that?
15	А	(CC) I mean, I'd like to just add, I think,
16		that, you know, FINTRAC and Department of
17		Finance were working quite closely with the
18		Financial Action Task Force at an early stage.
19		And, you know, when we were at the Vienna public
20		sector consultation with the FATF, FINTRAC's
21		draft laws had already been in place in
22		anticipation of what the FATF was going to
23		recommend.
24		So I do think you know, as Peter

mentioned I still think it is -- you know, they

1		are still in charge. There is still a top down
2		or there has been consultation. I think what
3		we've come up with has been largely driven by
4		working closely with the FATF and implementing,
5		you know, at an earlier stage maybe than some
6		what the recommendations were anticipated to be
7		there along with a couple of things that aren't
8		necessarily FATF recommendations but their own
9		interpretation of risk, risk-based requirements
10		that don't you know, that have been subject
11		of debate sort of within the VASP industry.
12		(PW) To answer your question, Ms. Patel, in
13		terms of is the tail wagging the dog, is the
14		private sector wagging the public sector's tail
15		in terms of regulation. I think it's true to a
16		certain extent but in a good way in terms of
17		efficacy of the whole purpose and raison d'être
18		of the whole program and purpose of AML
19		legislation. I think it's made it a lot more
20		effective.
21	Q	I guess sorry, the term actually I was
22		searching for is regulatory capture, or tail
23		wagging the dog. And I did ask I would ask
24		for the indulgence of my colleagues who I know
25		have questions.

1		I would like to ask you, Mr. Warrack, if
2		you could describe the other endeavour
3		that you referred to, Project Protect.
4	А	(PW) Very quickly, Project Protect relates to
5		human trafficking or anti-human trafficking
6		efforts in Canada and beyond. It started in
7		early 2016, again by myself, inspired by a
8		survivor a well-known survivor of human
9		trafficking in Canada. And basically I reached
10		out publicly in a public forum, the regulators
11		were there and committed the banks at that time
12		to working to combat human trafficking.
13		And FINTRAC were in the audience and this
14		aligned with their strategy, the change of heart
15		in terms of compliance for intelligence,
16		intelligence for law enforcement. And very,
17		very quickly it became an extremely successful
18		partnership which has resulted in massive
19		STR filings and more importantly disclosures to
20		law enforcement.
21		I was looking at the recent FINTRAC report
22		this morning actually, which came out about a
23		month ago I think, and year over year the number
24		of disclosures to law enforcement regarding
25		human trafficking have increased substantially.

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1	And it's basically industry and public sector
2	work and in partnership sharing best practices,
3	indicators of suspicion to enable the banks, for
4	instance, to detect human trafficking, report it
5	to FINTRAC and FINTRAC to share that with law
6	enforcement.
7	And as a result of that there have been a
8	number of subprojects since, all of which
9	delivering similar results on an ongoing basis
10	in relation to fentanyl trafficking, elderly
11	fraud, et cetera.
12	MS. PATEL: All right. Thank you. Mr. Commissioner,
13	those are my questions for these witnesses.
14	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Ms. Patel. And I think
15	Ms. Chewka for the province has been allocated
16	30 minutes.
17	MS. CHEWKA: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
18	EXAMINATION BY MS. CHEWKA:
19	Q Mr. Giles, I have a question beginning with you.
20	So you gave evidence that there is some desire
21	or what you're seeing as some trends in the
22	private industry to proactively develop strong
23	anti-money laundering policies separate from
24	what's required by government. Is it fair to

say that not every private entity in this

1		context is in fact doing this?
2	А	(GD) It might be. It might be fair to say that.
3		I think there a broad there's a spectrum of
4		entities in this industry who are some are
5		taking a very proactive approach, some are
6		taking a very reactive approach. I probably am
7		on one end of that scale, you know, experiencing
8		the proactive side of that. You know, people
9		are coming forward to understand how to comply.
10		But yeah, I would say it's probably a fair
11		statement.
12	Q	In your experience is there a way to incentivize
13		private entities to develop these strong AML
14		policies separate and apart from the use of what
15		I'll call a regulatory stick?
16	A	(GD) That's a good question. I think that
17		from what I've seen where the appetite to, let's
18		say, comply or to proactively get ahead of
19		regulations has the motivation is perhaps
20		there's a couple of reasons for it and, you
21		know, there is a very real I see a very real
22		even commercial impact of doing the right thing
23		from a regulatory point of view, certainly as a
24		customer of several exchanges. You know, I put
25		stock in those groups who are who seem to be

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1		doing the right thing from a regulatory point of
2		view.
3		I think the other sort of factor there would
4		be, you know, when there's a recognition of
5		collaboration and trying to develop a framework
6		that can most appropriately fit this industry.
7		And I think that's been some of the really
8		positive outcomes of the consultations and round
9		tables of regulators and so on is there's, I
10		believe, a genuine effort there to make efforts,
11		to make sure that these regulations and/or any
12		standards for that matter are you know, apply
13		appropriately to this industry and make sense
14		and are, you know, not just compliance for
15		compliance sake.
16		So yeah, so I think that those are that's
17		probably a couple of reasons that I would give.
18	Q	And I'll ask the same question of Mr. Mueller as
19		well. Based on your experience within the
20		private sector, can you explain to the
21		Commissioner how you might say how we could
22		incentivize this private sector to develop AML
23		policies separate and apart from that regulatory
24		stick?

(RM) Certainly. And I think one thing that

1		we've discussed fairly extensively throughout is
2		access to banking. So I think incentivizing
3		operators by giving them access to, say,
4		commercial banking at the same costs that a
5		normal business might have or even a luxury car
6		dealership, which is just as vulnerable to money
7		laundering as cryptocurrency, that would be a
8		great incentive. So I think and, you know,
9		Giles alluded to this earlier as well that a
10		lot of operators have been focused on the
11		commercial aspects maybe to get their business
12		up and running and less so on the compliance
13		aspects or the risk management. I think so
14		they're seeing the potential of fines, the
15		spectre of fines as the reason for compliance
16		and they're seeing compliance as a cost centre.
17		So if there was, for example, something like
18		access to banking to drive real value or at
19		least for them much more easily identified
20		value, that would be one incentive.
21	Q	Ms. Cieslik?
22	A	(CC) Yes. I mean, I agree with my panelists'
23		assessment of that so far as well. I mean, I'm
24		not sure if this qualifies as a regulatory
25		stick, but I think one of the things that is

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disincentivizing is that, you know, the global 1 2 aspect of virtual currency and the regional 3 aspect of compliance in Canada are at odds with 4 each other where you can operate a foreign 5 company that doesn't have to comply with the Canadian rules rather easily, and those entities 6 remain outside of any real reach of the 7 regulators for monitoring, supervision and 8 9 enforcement. So you are competing with other 10 exchanges that don't have these same requirements and don't have the same threat 11 12 because they've found creative ways of structuring their business, location-wise and 13 14 jurisdictions of lower regulatory oversight. 15 And -- but that does not prevent them from 16 reaching Canadians. 17 So I mean, I'm sorry if that does sort of 18 fall into the stick category, but I've often 19 said at the FINTRAC consultations and obviously 20 more so in my previous employment you could 21 literally walk down the street and audit me at 22 any time and I would have been well ready for 23 them, but you're doing the same to all the other 24 entities that serve Canadians and possibly can

harm Canadians that aren't down the street. And

1		so an unevenness of application is a perception.
2		Again, sorry, that might not be a stick thing,
3		but I'll go to Ryan's banking comment and really
4		push that one too as a non-stick option.
5	Q	And, Mr. Warrack, do you have anything to add to
6		those comments?
7	А	(PW) Yeah, I was actually going to say what Ryan
8		had said about banking. I think that's the
9		biggest incentive that could be offered.
10	Q	Ms. Cieslik, in your evidence today you discuss
11		some of the limits inherent to the FINTRAC
12		reporting requirements. Would you say that one
13		of the limits to the FINTRAC requirements is
14		that they are largely reactive in nature as
15		opposed to preventative?
16	A	(CC) Yeah, I mean, certainly the reporting
17		regime is reactive because you're looking for
18		activities after they occur, you know, when it
19		comes to the value-based reporting requirements,
20		so large cash large wire and, soon to come,
21		large virtual currency. You know and
22		suspicious activity reporting again is reactive,
23		you know, forgetting without talking about
24		attempted suspicious activity for now. But that
25		there is, you know, sort of a very subjective

1		assessment as to what is suspicious in the new
2		and burgeoning industry.
3		So I do think sorry, could you maybe just
4		repeat the question so I that can make sure I
5		fully answer it.
6	Q	Of course. My question was whether or not you
7		would agree that the FINTRAC reporting
8		requirements or the FINTRAC requirements
9		generally, one of the limits may be that they
10		are largely reactive rather than preventative in
11		nature?
12	А	(CC) Yeah, I think that would go for, you know,
13		Canada as well as any other jurisdiction that
14		has implemented, you know, post-reporting
15		requirements. It's just it's a fact that it
16		happens after.
17	Q	We've heard from witnesses this week that
18		realtime monitoring is critically important when
19		attempting to address illicit activity,
20		particularly money laundering, in the context of
21		virtual assets. Would you agree with that
22		regarding the importance of realtime monitoring?
23	А	(CC) Yes, I would agree with that. I would only
24		want to distinguish, you know, a couple of
25		things here is that I know there's been a focus

on the risk-based tools such as Chainalysis, and 1 2 I do believe -- and correct me if I'm wrong --3 that that the general sentiment about what 4 realtime reporting is, so being -- or 5 monitoring, so being able to screen those wallets at -- you know, at the time of 6 inception. And that works well for use of those 7 softwares who have risk analytics and they sort 8 9 of all have different methodologies, proprietary 10 methodologies, about how they assess that risk. But I think we also can't forget about the 11 12 fact that there is fiat movements requiring 13 monitoring that don't offer that same, you know, 14 sort of risk analytic built in. And that when 15 you look at suspicious activity, ongoing 16 transaction monitoring requirements, there may be -- need to be a longer time period in order 17 18 to evidence a pattern of activity that would be 19 able to be captured and assessed as a red flag 20 as opposed to sort of a -- you know, a one-off 21 that might be able to be caught in a 22 CipherTrace, Chainalysis-type software as this is a bad wallet. That's that sort of immediate 23 24 gratification of risk as opposed to a suspicious 25 activity that takes a longer group of

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1 transactions to determine.

2 0 As I understand it -- and please correct me if 3 I'm wrong in my understanding -- is that a lot of our focus on regulation has really been 4 5 reactive in nature and not so much preventative with the exception of things like KYC policies 6 and things like that. In your view and based on 7 your experience, what additional steps can be 8 9 taken to prevent or mitigate the risks such as 10 money laundering associated with virtual assets? So how do we get ahead of it instead of 11 12 responding to this after the fact? 13 Α (CC) Well, I mean, I think that's a difficult 14 thing to do, you know, to sort of -- you know, I 15 think I'm famous for saying I don't have a 16 crystal ball when I'm looking at somebody's financial activity to imagine they might be 17 18 doing something wrong. While the red flags and 19 indicators exist to sort of look at behaviour 20 and make some determination, the standard of 21 reasonableness changes depending on who is 22 looking at that output. And, you know, you 23 can't really sort of pin that down to a science, 24 I don't think, quite yet.

Is the mandate to prevent money laundering?

I believe those words are in the mandate for

FINTRAC. Is that in the mandate of a private

business, is another, you know, sort of good

question. Certainly I don't think any business

wants to welcome with open arms criminal

activity because it's bad for business generally

overall, though it might be profitable to start.

I don't necessarily think I have an answer to the preventative aspect and I've worked in this industry for almost 20 years at this point, and it can be somewhat disappointing to know. But I think we also have to remember that any time there is a new payment method, a new type of -- you know, a way to move value, there is going to be somebody who's ten steps ahead of you who knows how to exploit that and you won't even know about them. And that this all does tend to be reactive because of the way intelligence is shared.

And I think one of the -- if I can make one final point on that is that, you know, I did listen in on the RCMP presentation the other day kind of expecting to hear, like, what are they going to say about crypto? And I've worked with most of the people on that panel previously in

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educational aspects and, you know, very familiar 1 2 with kind of what the RCMP is looking at from 3 their national virtual currency, you know, 4 group. 5 But that we don't know things that they know. So, like, they may be investigating cases 6 and there isn't that sharing of information 7 that -- you know, so we don't find out until 8 long after potentially that somebody is a 9 10 confirmed criminal. And then maybe looking back at the pattern of activity it's, like, oh, okay, 11 12 well, maybe. But the intelligence sharing --13 the lack of intelligence sharing, and I do 14 understand that there are reasons for not 15 sharing and not sharing. But that, you know, a 16 better balance there might allow for some more 17 preventative measures as opposed to three years 18 after a case is final and then there's a Globe 19 and Mail news article, and you say oh, let's 20 search that name and then we report everything 21 that we have. 22 When you say "information sharing," can you be 23 more specific as to between which entities you 24 would say would be key for information sharing

for this purpose of preventing or mitigating

2	A	(CC) Yeah, I think we've seen some evidence, you
3		know, by the other panelists of sort of the
4		interVASP community sharing information. And
5		certainly there's been a little bit of that
6		with when it comes to fraudulent activity or
7		stolen funds. There is a group of people that
8		share wallet addresses to ensure, like, if money
9		is coming from this to you guys, like, don't
10		accept it or block that wallet. So there's some
11		of that sort of grassroots movement there.

I know one of my larger challenges in dealing with financial institutions was, you know, the lack of sort of reciprocal sharing of information under the auspices of PIPEDA, which I fully respect and understand, you know, although there are carveouts for threats to the security of Canada. But, you know, that --where crypto-companies have a view into the activity that they're doing with a customer at a single point in time whereas a bank or financial institutions of another sort -- let's not just pick on banks -- securities company, et cetera. They have accounts. They have history of relationship. They might have more than one

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1		product. You have your RSP, your loan, your
2		mortgage. And we're only seeing this one aspect
3		of their behaviour.
4		Again, I don't think I have the full
5		answer or how to best share information in
6		respect of privacy, but I'll point to the thing
7		that everybody points to in the cryptospace is
8		that in the US they've had the 314 I can
9		never remember it's (a) or (b), but 314(a) and
10		(b) where law enforcement can send out a
11		bulletin, you know, to all participating
12		entities, and saying hey, we know something
13		about this guy.
14		And I've worked with those in the US in my
15		time in New York and, you know, being able to
16		kind of that was a very timely way to sort of
17		get out some police-level information and rally
18		all the financial entities that are kind of
19		under that rule, under BSA, to respond
20		accordingly and provide good intelligence to
21		police officers, and, again, in a quicker
22		fashion than going through the STR disclosure
23		process.
24	Q	Mr. Warrack, can you add anything to that

answer with respect to what can be done as a

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1		preventative or mitigate these risks?
2	А	(PW) I disagree with the kind of statement that,
3		you know, STRs, et cetera, are reactive as
4		opposed to preventative. I think that's true on
5		a kind of one-off basis, but I think over a
6		period of time if an exchange or a bank has
7		robust policies and regimes in place that
8		includes reporting, et cetera, the criminal
9		lawyers are going know, the bad actors are going
10		to go somewhere else and there will be less and
11		less places for them to go until they make that
12		step into the dark side of things where they
13		don't go to a bank at all or they don't use an
14		exchange at all. I would say that.
15	Q	Mr. Mueller?
16	А	(RM) I mean, I would kind of echo what Charlene
17		said, like, you certainly like, we can
18		prevent third-party transactions. We can do PEP
19		determinations. We can tend to discourage
20		bribery and corruption. But it I mean, you
21		can never prevent a person that comes in using
22		their own identity documents and bank account
23		expressly to launder money.
24		So, like, one case that I would say, we

received a subpoena for information on the

client some two years after the transactions. Came in, properly identified himself, identity document, proof of life video. So we have people move a bit to prove they're alive while they're signing up so that you, you know, you can't game us with a selfie. Proof of address, corporate bank accounts, corporate documents proving that he was a signatory with the ability to move funds out of the account, bought a lot of bitcoin that seemed relevant to the stated purpose of business. And then years later it was hey, this guy actually was laundering 600,000. 

And I think that one thing that I've gone back and forth with heads of sales at many businesses that I've worked at is requesting an unredacted bank statement showing the previous 30 days' activity when someone is doing a high-amount wire to show that it isn't a straight in-out wire. So those funds aren't coming from a compromised bank account in the chain or things like this. But, you know, the ability to implement those and the impact on the commercial volumes of your business as well as a customers -- a legitimate customer, especially

1		in crypto where people are, you know, very often
2		privacy focused, there's a lot of kind of push
3		and pull in that regard.
4		So I can definitely picture a customer's
5		intake process in a transaction validation
6		process that eliminates 99 point, you know, a
7		lot of 9s percent of fraud and money laundering,
8		but that's also going to scare off lots of
9		customers that you know. We have people with
10		bitcoin going up that they're putting their life
11		savings in hoping for a short-term return and so
12		on and they may not understand why I would want
13		their bank statements and they may not want to
14		give them to me.
15		So I think it's a achievable, but you
16		know, to use a platitude, but at what cost?
17	Q	And Mr. Dixon?
18	A	(GD) Yeah, I think I would echo a lot of what my
19		fellow panelists have said. And I would
20		probably add that, you know, it's important to
21		perhaps note that even if some of the money
22		laundering controls that perhaps have either,
23		you know, been enforced through regulation or
24		even just proactively on exchanges, it's
25		important to know that even if they appear

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perhaps somehow reactive, the nature of those 1 2 controls, I would argue, allow you to have a 3 better chance at being preventative in the 4 future. 5 So what I mean by that is by monitoring for customer behaviour or for, you know, collecting 6 identification from a customer at on-boarding, 7 you know, there's an element of that which is 8 very much preventative. So, you know, sanction 9 10 screening or understanding who you're dealing with as a customer in an attempt to curb 11 12 potential risk and identify and mitigate 13 potential risk going forward. 14 However, if the risk were to occur, the idea 15 of, for example, ongoing monitoring, as we've 16 talked about and the panelists have talked about, and other forms of control from a money 17 18 laundering perspective while reactive, should 19 serve to inform a better preventative, you know, 20 money laundering program going forward. So 21 it's -- they're both -- they both sort of 22 fulfill each other even though they may appear to be somehow reactive. 23

The other thing I would add is at perhaps an

industry level, you know -- and we've talked

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1		about, I think, your previous question around
2		the regulation being reactive or the approach to
3		regulation. You know, I think there are
4		whilst it is reactive, I think there are
5		certainly things that can be done to, say,
6		increase the speed of reaction, let's say, to
7		those regulations.
8		And, again, I'm repeating a lot of what
9		we've talked about but are good examples of all
10		the good collaboration that we've talked about
11		in the industry, the engagement in which you
12		know, I must give credit to the regulators for
13		doing with the crypto-industry and helping to
14		shape and form the regulations is all good.
15		However you know, we've talked a lot about
16		exchanges. We also have a number of other
17		business models and developing types of business
18		in this crypto-industry which, you know, really
19		the it's extremely grey on how and if the
20		regulations can even capture them.
21		So there is a need for, let's say, increased
22		collaboration, but certainly there's a lot that
23		we can do to speed up that reaction.
24	Q	On that point, we've actually heard from

witnesses this week about some what they say are

potential solutions to some of these risks that 1 2 we're seeing with respect to third-party public 3 exchanges. And so on the one hand we have Sergeant Vickery of the RCMP proposing the 4 5 elimination of third-party public exchanges and the incorporation of virtual assets directly 6 within financial institutions, on the other hand 7 we have Mr. Spiro testifying that there would be 8 9 some benefit of legitimizing these third-party 10 public exchanges by bringing them into a regulatory framework that simultaneously would 11 12 respect their expertise. 13 And I'm wondering, Mr. Dixon, if you can 14 comment on where you fall on either one those solutions or whether there's a third option 15 16 available here as to how to address some of 17 these money laundering risks that we're seeing 18 associated with third-party public exchanges. 19 (GD) Can you help me, what you is your Α

definition of a third-party public exchange?

Q As I understand it -- and you can correct me if

I'm wrong on this, but as I understand it there

is -- financial institutions are not dealing

directly with virtual assets. And so in order

to have an on- or off-ramp into this area you

1		need to have a third party transferring the
2		virtual asset into a fiat currency, essentially.
3		And so it's basically the third party that's
4		communicating between the two, is how it's been
5		defined or used by the witnesses this week.
6	А	(GD) Okay. I'm not sure I follow. I think
7		yeah, I mean so maybe I'll pick up on
8		something that you've said. So the I think
9		one of your points was around whether the
10		banks or the banks currently don't interact
11		directly with virtual currency. So and let
12		me know if this is some kind of response.
13		So I think yeah, I don't know what
14		I I would like to make a distinction perhaps
15		between cryptocurrency and the technology that
16		underpins cryptocurrency and you know,
17		because we have seen the large banking
18		institutions starting to utilize, I would say,
19		the technology that underpins virtual currency
20		and cryptocurrency for to improve their
21		processes or offer additional services to their
22		customers. I don't know that sort of wiping out
23		that industry is necessarily the best approach.
24		I would always like to think that there would
25		be, you know, good dialogue and an opportunity

1		to understand how oversight could be applied to
2		that industry in an appropriate way. But,
3		again, I'd have to understand a bit more about
4		the type of company you're referring to.
5	Q	Do any of the other panelists have a comment to
6		be made on that? Yes, Ms. Cieslik.
7	А	(CC) If I could interject now. I didn't quite
8		interpret Sergeant Vickery's statement the same
9		way, now, and I feel like if I can offer some
10		perspective on it. She may have been referring
11		to the third-party payment processors in the
12		sense that if you're a cryptocurrency
13		exchange we'll just pick on exchanges right
14		now and you can't get a bank account, that
15		you're using a third-party payment processor who
16		is effectively shielding the bank's knowledge of
17		you operating through them by virtue of this
18		payment service provider. Again, I still
19		wouldn't advocate for elimination of that, you
20		know, because I think there's room for sort of
21		all models of that. I mean, eliminating a
22		payment service provider because they might have
23		a risk of this is just as bad a kicking out all
24		cryptos or kicking out all original MSBs. I
25		don't think any of that positive for the

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Canadian landscape of business particularly with
any of these being able to be done in another
country.

But secondly what I took her comment maybe to say too was that this lack of being able to have a bank account is sort of the -- is one of the blockers and that, you know, bringing cryptos in -- you know, out of the shadows and into the fold of being able to directly have these relationships does allow for, you know, a greater sort of amount of transparency and oversight and enforcement where, you know, FINTRAC may not have. And I think we've all sort of read about that and seen that, you know, have the resources to manage, you know, the thousands of entities currently under their reporting entity requirements. You're now adding potentially thousands of more. And who is sort of -- without a secondary regulator. I mean, we've got -- the securities dealers have the securities regulators provincially and sort of the CSA and we've got banks with OSFI. know, MSBs don't have that sort of second-level regulator.

I won't say I'm advocating for yet another

1		regulator, but I will say, you know, one the
2		things I've learned in my dealings with banks is
3		that they're sharing place to keep you in line
4		with your anti-money laundering requirements
5		where FINTRAC might not be.
6	Q	And Mr. Mueller?
7	А	(RM) Sorry, I was muted. So I actually would
8		tend to agree with, you know, what everyone else
9		has kind of said. I don't have much to add on
10		this one.
11	Q	Mr. Warrack? Mr. Warrack, do you have anything
12		to add on that or no?
13	А	(PW) Yeah, if your initial interpretation, as
14		you described it, of what the sergeant had said
15		is correct, that you eliminate the third
16		party I'm not sure what you called them, but
17		I think that is a very myopic approach and
18		misses the whole point of cryptocurrency. And
19		why it came about in the first instance with
20		bitcoin was to do away with banks and
21		intermediaries and third parties.
22	Q	This actually leads quite nicely into last
23		question I have for the panel today. We've
24		spoken a lot about how to regulate in this area,
25		and maybe how to regulate more effectively. My

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1 question is are there any disadvantages that you 2 see to a more heavy-handed regulatory approach? 3 For example, I'm thinking about stifling of 4 innovation. And I'm wondering if, Mr. Warrack, 5 you can comment on that first, and then we'll go through the other panel members. 6 (PW) Yeah, I would agree with that, I think it 7 Α would stifle innovation, but it would also drive 8 9 the transactions away from the regulated entities such as VASP into the dark world of --10 whether there's no visibility. 11 12 Mr. Dixon? 0 13 Α (GD) Yeah. There is -- I think I would agree 14 with the innovation approach. There's -- I 15 think what I've seen -- what we've seen in 16 Canada is there's been some partially, you know, successful attempts in terms of sandboxes and so 17 18 on which allow for a little bit more flexibility 19 to sort of play out, let's say, some different 20 types of business models in a confined 21 environment which, you know, I think is an 22 attempt to get around some of that stifling of 23 innovation. But yeah, for sure, stifling of 24 innovation. I think it could have the effect of -- and one of our fellow panelists was

1		talking earlier about the sort of alignment of
2		regulation between jurisdictions.
3		And, you know, I think we've seen and maybe
4		touched on a little bit of one of the impacts of
5		this, which is that entities operating, for
6		example, in Canada who might feel that the
7		approach is too heavy handed or unreasonably so
8		will potentially move out of the jurisdiction or
9		this jurisdiction and across to others. There
10		are certainly, you know, intelligence
11		disadvantages from that in terms of the
12		information that will somehow then not flow to
13		the Canadian the people in Canada, the
14		intelligence units. But it also has a
15		competitiveness advantage as well for the
16		cryptocurrency industry as a whole, if we're
17		using Canada as an example, you know, in Canada.
18		So not only are there money laundering or
19		are there intelligence implications there's also
20		broader, you know, competitive implications, I
21		think, of that.
22	Q	And Ms. Cieslik?
23	А	(CC) I mean, that's been a very common theme and
24		topic across the last few years of this is
25		that I don't think you know, I hope that

Canada and many other countries, like, don't

want to make it so difficult that it drives out

a whole industry that creates jobs, that

enhances the tech capabilities of a country and

that kind of thing.

So while the spirit of the legislation in

saying, you know, nobody -- I don't think
anybody actually actively set out and wants this
to be the area of choice for criminal activity
and therefore I don't think it should be
penalized as such particularly, I think more
comparison and more sort of an impact type of
analysis needs to be done of, say, this industry
versus the already larger well-established
multibillion dollar industries that are
currently under regulatory reviews and regimes,
and where crypto fits in with that.

I mean, I certainly think a measured regulatory response in relation to that true assessment of risk to Canada and Canadians would be more helpful in defining a more specific regulatory machine that isn't just saying well, it's like an MSB or it's like a broker-dealer or it's cash but it's -- you know, you're trying to fit -- again I'll use a platitude -- a square

1		peg into a round hole. I think over time we'll
2		see, like, it's not any of those while being a
3		little bit of all of those, will hopefully lead
4		maybe to a very a more targeted, you know,
5		regime around what it actually is for the
6		industry.
7	Q	Lastly, Mr. Mueller, I think you've hinted maybe
8		at some of this already in one of your responses
9		to my earlier questions. But I'm wondering if
10		you can speak to this question of disadvantages
11		to regulation. And you kind of, I think, hinted
12		to one of them being privacy concerns as well.
13		And so I'm wondering if you can maybe speak to
14		that and any other disadvantages you've seen.
15	A	(RM) Sure. So, I mean, I've been like,
16		before I was Chief Compliance Officer of
17		Chief Compliance Officer of Netcoins I was, you
18		know, head of risk management and business
19		development for a payment processor that did
20		lots of bitcoin businesses in Canada. So I'm
21		not sure that I've seen a disadvantage to
22		applying the MSB regulation to the number of
23		businesses operating in the virtual currency
24		space in Canada. I think the only ones that
25		crossed our desk back then that are no longer

1	around were Quadriga, a related exchange Taurus.
2	You know, everybody else is still kind of
3	around.
4	So I'm not sure that applying MSB
5	regulations has necessarily eliminated anyone
6	from operating in Canada. It may have, as Peter
7	alluded to, driven some of the bad traffic
8	offshore into privacy coins and these kind of
9	things, but I don't necessarily think that
10	characterizing MSB registration and compliance
11	as heavy handed is correct because you can
12	register as an MSB and get your number fairly
13	easily. And based on the resources that FINTRAC
14	has to apply desk exams, you may operate
15	for years without anyone necessarily knowing if
16	your regime is compliant with the requirements
17	and so on.
18	So I think that I'm kind of wandering around
19	a short answer that is, you know, in my
20	experience I haven't seen the current regulation
21	necessarily stifle any technological
22	developments or anything of that nature. And I
23	think Dash was developed in Canada. So, I mean,
24	MSB regulation didn't stop a privacy coin from
25	starting here.

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1	So yeah, I think it remains to be seen what
2	impact MSB registration and requirements will
3	have on VASPs because, I mean, it's only been
4	five months since June.
5	MS. CHEWKA: Thank you. Those are my question for
6	this panel, Mr. Commissioner.
7	THE COMMISSIONER: I'm sorry, I muted myself. Thank
8	you, Ms. Chewka.
9	I'll now ask Ms. Shelley on behalf of Canada
10	to commence her questions. And I think you've
11	been allocated 10 minutes, Ms. Shelley.
12	MS. SHELLEY: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. Based on
13	the testimony this morning, Canada does not have
14	any question for these witnesses.
15	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Ms. Shelley.
16	Ms. Magonet for the British Columbia Civil
17	Liberties Association, who has been allocated
18	30 minutes.
19	MS. MAGONET: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. Can
20	everyone hear me okay? Okay. Great. Thank
21	you.
22	EXAMINATION BY MS. MAGONET:
23	Q So I first have some general questions for the

panel regarding virtual assets and blockchain

technology. And I would just say that whoever

1		feels best positioned on the panel to
2		answer these questions can address them.
3		So my first question is whether you would
4		agree that blockchain technology, which is the
5		foundation of cryptocurrency, has applications
6		outside the realm of cryptocurrency?
7	A	(RM) Yes, I would agree with that.
8		(CC) As well, I would agree.
9		(GD) I agree.
10	Q	Fantastic. And would you agree that some
11		examples of these applications include digital
12		voting, art, music, collective decision-making
13		platforms?
14	А	(CC) Yes, would agree with that.
15		(RM) I agree.
16		(GD) Yeah.
17	Q	And would you agree that an overly aggressive
18		approach to the regulation of cryptocurrency
19		could stifle innovation in the uses of
20		blockchain technology, both in the financial
21		sector and non-financial sector?
22	A	(CC) I think as part of the consultation process
23		that I was part of with FINTRAC and Department
24		of Finance there was a deep concern for ensuring
25		a limitation, you know, on regulation, that it

1		wouldn't address certain things as you
2		mentioned, art or, you know, even a close-looped
3		type of token, you know, anything sort of
4		smart-contract based. You know, I think that
5		list is maybe small to medium sized now, but I
6		do know that there was, you know, the industry
7		outcry, for lack of a better word, and a
8		receptiveness from the government agencies to
9		provide some interpretation on what is and isn't
10		subject to MSB rules, although I do think that
11		continues to evolve and will need work over
12		time.
13	Q	Thank you. And would you agree if Canada took a
14		draconian approach to regulating cryptocurrency
15		and didn't bear these concerns in mind, as you
16		say they did, that in the future there could be
17		a potential to stifle the development of
18		blockchain technology?
19	A	(GD) I might jump in on this one, if that's
20		okay.
21	Q	Certainly.
22	A	(GD) I think it's important to make the
23		distinction between cryptocurrency and
24		blockchain and what they are and what they're
25		not and how they're linked and how they are not.

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2 specific. 3 The regulations -- so blockchain is the 4 underpinning technology of cryptocurrency, as 5 we've talked about. But as you've alluded to in your questioning, the technology itself, 6 blockchain, has a lot of potential applications 7 outside of cryptocurrency, which traditionally 8 has been more of a use case of transferring 9 10 value. So a blockchain is typically a sort of -- a fancy way of storing data. It doesn't 11 12 have to be about necessarily moving monetary 13 value. So I think the regulation of 14 cryptocurrency specifically or, maybe being even 15 more specific, the entities that are 16 facilitating the movement of money or value 17 through blockchain, if the regulation in that 18 side of the house, the cryptocurrency side of 19 the house is overly burdensome, it may well 20 stifle innovation within the cryptocurrency's 21 sphere. But I think that's partly somewhat 22 removed from the broader blockchain conversation 23 where we're not getting into the conversation 24 around movement of value and where the financial 25 regulators are looking. They're not looking so

And so that's very vague, so I'll be a bit more

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1		much in that aspect. It's more around the
2		movement of monetary value, which is
3		cryptocurrency, versus blockchain more broadly,
4		which is to do with storage of data.
5	Q	Thank you, Mr. Dixon. Perhaps I'll address my
6		next question to Ms. Cieslik. Did I pronounce
7		your name properly?
8	A	(CC) Yes, you're doing good at that.
9	Q	Okay. Great. Thank you. Because you alluded
10		to this a bit earlier. Would you agree that
11		some virtual assets are non-fungible?
12	А	(CC) Define "non-fungible."
13	Q	So that they are I'm referring to
14		non-fungible tokens that are unique rather than
15		mutually interchangeable.
16	А	(CC) You are speaking about these close-looped
17		type of things, they have no value outside of an
18		ecosystem?
19	Q	No, I'm not referring to well, perhaps those
20		also fall within this category. But I'm
21		referring to for example, to non-fungible
22		tokens like crypto-art, crypto-games and
23		crypto-collectibles.
24	A	(CC) Can you repeat the question, then.

Certainly. You would agree that the category of

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1		virtual assets includes non-fungible tokens?
2	А	(CC) It depends on who you ask. You know,
3		again, I think back to my earlier comment is
4		that this question had definitely come up during
5		the FINTRAC, you know, consultation process and
6		I think Giles alluded to the idea that, you
7		know, cryptocurrency is one movement of value
8		but that there are these sorts of alternate, you
9		know, blockchain uses, some of which may allow a
10		movement of a different kind of value.
11		So I think it is you know, it hasn't been
12		clarified specifically by Canadian government.
13		I think it is still sort of under definition in
14		several jurisdictions. But that I think
15		people might be familiar with CryptoKitties or
16		other kind of you know, even, as you
17		mentioned, game-based tokens. These things do
18		have a value. If you tokenize an asset that has
19		a value, then certainly you can move value with
20		that, even if it's not the cryptocurrency
21		itself. And I think art is often one of the
22		things that is brought up. I know there are
23		lots of companies working on tokenization of
24		those kinds of assets. Ad regardless of the

blockchain application of it, I think all of

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1		those have been discussed in the industry at
2		large about their culpability in being able to
3		use to move funds and launder money.
4		(RM) Can I just add to that.
5	Q	Of course. Sorry. Go ahead.
6	А	(RM) So I have, like, a lot of experience with
7		payment processing and I think when there is a,
8		quote/unquote, non-fungible token, for example,
9		World of Warcraft Blizzard or Second Life
10		dollars, you'll find that people are actually
11		really willing to pay real money for this.
12		So I worked for a payment processor years
13		ago and our number one fraudulent merchant we
14		serviced gambling merchants and very nascent
15		digital currencies, our number one fraudulent
16		merchant was sold Second Life dollars. So we
17		would have people signing up fraudulent
18		accounts, going to this exchange based in
19		Austria and exchanging real money for a bar in
20		Second Life or for a Warcraft sword. And we
21		didn't anticipate this to happen and we didn't
22		anticipate these currencies to have value
23		outside of these games, but users were willing
24		to pay real money for them and steal real money

to pay for them and then sell them again.

1		So I guess what I'm just adding is that even
2		where a token is not intended to have that kind
3		of usage, users might figure out a way to do it.
4		(CC) I'll just add to that that both
5		fraudulent and non-fraudulent transactions could
6		occur in that way.
7	Q	Thanks to both of you. Would you agree that
8		there's a or sorry. Let me rephrase this
9		question. Would you agree that non-fungible
10		tokens, including CryptoKitties, allow users to
11		engage in expressive and associative activities
12		like the creation and sharing of art?
13	A	(CC) Certainly.
14	Q	And would you agree that in order to purchase a
15		non-fungible asset like a CryptoKitty, users
16		generally need to use a virtual currency to do
17		so?
18	A	(CC) Yes.
19	Q	And would you therefore agree that the
20		regulation of fungible virtual assets like
21		bitcoin may have implications for the use and
22		development of non-fungible virtual assets?
23	A	(CC) Of course. Yes.
24	Q	Thank you. I would now like to ask some

questions about a document.

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1	MS.	MAGONET: And I would ask if Madam Registrar
2		could please pull this up. It's the Central 1
3		Credit Union anti-money laundering
4		counter-terrorist financing requirements
5		document. And I believe it was also listed as
6		an appendix, though I'm now forgetting which
7		appendix it was. Oh, you've nonetheless found
8		it. Thank you.
9	Q	Is the panel familiar with this document?
10	A	(CC) Very much, yes.
11	Q	Sorry, please go ahead.
12	A	(PW) I'm somewhat familiar with it. I did read
13		it.
14		(GD) Somewhat.
15	Q	Okay. Thank you. I will so I just have a
16		few questions about this document. I think
17		Ms. Cieslik or Mr. Warrack might be best
18		positioned to answer them, but I leave it to you
19		to determine that.
20		Do you know if these requirements resemble
21		the AML requirements adopted by other credit
22		unions? Is this representative of frequent
23		practice, in your knowledge?
24	А	(PW) I don't have that information.

(CC) Yeah, I might be able to speak to that.

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So, I mean, as a -- full disclosure, as part of
my work as a consultant in sort of the eight to
ten years ago area I worked quite closely in the
Central 1 body and credit unions all across
Canada and the US, although this is specific to
credit unions here.

So the Central 1 issues guidance out to the credit unions network to say, this is what you're allowed to do and not allowed to do. I do remember when this came out, and I've seen it previously -- and if you can just scroll down a touch -- you know, I think the reason also I became more familiar with it in my later career is that in attempting to get bank accounts for crypto-based companies or even traditional money services businesses ten years ago there -- that sort of stigma carried through and put upon cryptocurrency-based companies. So many -- I won't say all but many credit unions in my experience have declined or denied access to banking to crypto-based companies. And I believe -- I would strongly believe that it is party to this -- release of this document.

24 Q Thank you. Sorry, go ahead.

25 A (CC) I won't say that all credit unions are like

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Eriam Dy 110.	110301	
1		that.
2	MS.	MAGONET: Okay. Thank you. Madam Registrar, if
3		you could scroll down a little bit. That's
4		perfect.
5	Q	So here you would agree that Central 1 lists
6		some transactions that are prohibited between
7		certain times of entity or countries?
8	A	(CC) Yes.
9	Q	And you would agree that on the list of
10		prohibited types of entities and industries
11		pornography is listed?
12	A	(CC) Yes, it is there.
13	Q	And would you agree that the pornography
14		industry frequently faces barriers in facing
15		access to banking services and credit cards?
16	A	(CC) From my experience, yes, I would agree with
17		that. There is a category of customers commonly
18		or sometimes referred as "the sin group" that
19		may have previously or currently are rejected
20		based on their activities, though not illegal,
21		may be determined to be a risk that the
22		financial institution does not wish to manage.
23	Q	Thank you. And are you aware that
24		cryptocurrency is therefore increasingly popular

as a method of payment among sex workers?

- 1 A (CC) I am familiar with that, yes.
- 2 Q And that its advantages include not only the
- 3 fact that sex workers can face barriers in
- 4 accessing banking services but also due to the
- 5 pseudo anonymity provided by cryptocurrency?
- 6 A (CC) Yes, I'm familiar.
- 7 MS. MAGONET: Thank you. If -- Madam Registrar, if
- 8 you could please go to page 2 of this document.
- 9 That's a great spot.
- 10 Q On this page Central 1 explains that
- international wire transfers cannot be sent to
- or from the countries or clients listed there.
- 13 You would agree with that?
- 14 A (CC) Yes.
- 15 Q All right. Okay. Great. Thank you. And that
- these clients include businesses that are legal
- in Canada such as marijuana distributors. You
- 18 would agree?
- 19 A (CC) Yes, I would agree. I would like to point
- out sort of the dual column, you know, item is
- that there are countries restricted and there
- are entities restricted. Now, countries will
- 23 come from some level of sanction. All the
- 24 regions listed there have sanctions against
- them, some of which require a full ban, not all

1		of which require a full ban of the country. So
2		there is some interpretation added to that
3		column as, I think, what you are getting at
4		and forgive me for jumping ahead is that the
5		items listed in the left column are not illegal
6		businesses but they have decided to put
7		restrictions on them with respect to
8		international transactions, wire transfers
9		specifically.
10	Q	Great. Thank you. And you would agree that an
11		individual may want to send a wire transfer to
12		one of these countries for a totally legitimate
13		reason, for example, to send money to a family
14		member?
15	А	(CC) Yes. And I'll just go back to my prior
16		comment that, you know, the sanctions differ on
17		what they require financial institutions to do.
18		So, you know, without going into a full analysis
19		of each of the countries, you know, there are
20		definitely legitimate reasons to send money to
21		all of those countries that may not necessarily
22		fall under sanctions, but for potentially Iran,
23		but I would need to just brush up my Iran
24		knowledge once again. But I believe Iran and
25		North Korea are the ones have that full

1	contrabands and the	rest are specific names or
2	types of activities.	So, again, there's some
3	interpretation on the	e countries there.
4	Q And would you agree	generally that this document
5	demonstrates that son	me entities and individuals
6	face barriers in acce	essing banking services?
7	A (CC) Absolutely. I v	would agree with that.
8	Q And that in some case	es cryptocurrency may
9	provide a viable alte	ernative for them to engage
10	in financial transact	tions?
11	A (CC) Yes. And I do h	pelieve that's one of the,
12	you know, positive fe	eatures of virtual currency
13	and one that is wide	ly discussed in the
14	industry.	
15	MS. MAGONET: Thank you.	Mr. Commissioner, if this
16	could be please be ma	arked as the next exhibit.
17	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. V	Very well. That will be
18	are we at 266, Madam	Registrar?
19	THE REGISTRAR: This one v	will be 268. The last one
20	was the City of Vanco	ouver memo, 267, so this is
21	268.	
22	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank y	you.
23	EXHIBIT 268: Central	l 1 Credit Union Anti-Money
24	Laundering and Counte	er-Terrorist Financing

Requirements

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1	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
2	MS. MAGONET: Madam Registrar, if you could please
3	pull up the City of Vancouver memo again. That
4	would be great.
5	So earlier Ms. Patel discussed or took
6	the panel through this memo and discussed how it
7	explains that Vancouver is considering the
8	regulation of bitcoin ATMs.
9	Madam Registrar, if you could please go to
10	page I think I believe it's page 4 of the
11	moment. Yes.
12	Q And I would like to ask the panel if you're
13	aware that in this memo the working group takes
14	the position that it would not be appropriate to
15	ban bitcoin ATMs but that regulation is a better
16	approach?
17	A (RM) Yes.
18	(CC) Yes.
19	(PW) Yes.
20	MS. MAGONET: Thank you. Madam Registrar, if you
21	could please go to page 5.
22	Q And would the panel agree that some of the
23	reasons given or rather, one the reasons
24	given for adopting a regulatory approach was a

fear that banning bitcoin ATMs could stifle

1 innovation?

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2 (RM) I might have misread the memo, but it Α 3 seemed to me that their position was that this 4 might have a negative impact on the businesses 5 that are hosting these ATMs, for example, convenience stores and so on, not necessarily --6 7 I mean, Charlene, you can correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't know that there's any, like, 8 9 groundbreaking innovation happening in the 10 bitcoin ATM space. It's kind of like there's a wheel and we might, you know, improve on the 11 wheel, but I don't know if there's, like, 12 13 wheel 3.0 in the pipeline kind of thing. 14 (CC) I mean, I would separate the idea that, 15 you know, the machines themselves may undergo 16 some form of innovation because they're fairly straightforward and simple types of -- you know, 17 18 it's like white label ATM machines before them. 19 You know, it is sort of a single- or 20 dual-function aspect. But what I interpreted 21 the innovation paragraph as being is that this 22 is a recognized method of entry into the virtual 23 asset space and that a ban on it would be 24 perceived as, you know, a negative slight to

acceptance of cryptocurrency generally by sort

of demonizing this one entry point.

2 I think they use the words here "hostile," 3 "hostility" and "lack of government support" 4 which would just move them away and certainly, you know, remove jobs, and I would agree with 5 that impact against innovation, meaning that 6 businesses would -- who do these [indiscernible] 7 transactions would suffer and potentially leave 8 9 and jobs would suffer as a result and the 10 convenience and access of residents to being able to use them and therefore benefit from, you 11 12 know, use of cryptocurrency. 13 0 Thank you. And would you agree that another 14 reason listed for adopting a regulation -- or a 15 regulatory approach rather than a ban is that 16 white paper ATMs are also susceptible to fraud? (CC) Yeah, I mean, did find the term "white 17 Α 18 paper ATMs" to be a little offside. I mean, I 19 think commonly they're referred to as "white 20 label ATMs," but potentially there's a different 21 vernacular in the west that those of us in the 22 east don't use. Again, I did go through this 23 the first time around in my role as a consultant 24 both with big 4 and smaller boutique consulting 25 firms when white label ATMs first appeared. And

25

1	to clarify, those are not connected to any
2	specific bank but can be privately owned and
3	popped up in places very similar to where bit
4	ATMs are located. Gas stations, convenience
5	stores, et cetera. That, you know, there was a
6	suspicion that they were susceptible to fraud
7	and of course it was true of at the start, but
8	that, you know, again, banning them was decided
9	against and now they're fairly commonly
10	accepted. You see them everywhere you go. The
11	frauds have been somewhat mitigated, though not
12	completely removed. And so I do think what
13	they're pulling for here is a regulatory equity
14	in not sort of prohibiting one while allowing
15	the other.
16	Q Thank you. My last series of
17	MS. MAGONET: Madam Registrar, you can take down the
18	document. Thank you very much.
19	Q My last series of questions or for Mr. Warrack
20	and they concern Project Participate.
21	Mr. Warrack, you would agree that Project
22	Participate indicators of suspicion for virtual
23	asset providers, that document sets out a list
24	of indicators that a virtual asset service

provider should consider in determining whether

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Q

1		a transaction is suspicious?
2	A	(PW) That's correct. And it's not an exhaustive
3		list.
4	Q	And you would agree that virtual asset service
5		providers have obligations to report suspicious
6		transactions to FINTRAC?
7	A	(PW) Under the new regulations, yes.
8	Q	Thank you. And you would agree that some of the
9		indicators listed in this Project Participate
10		document may be present even if a transaction is
11		made for a legitimate purpose?
12	A	(PW) Absolutely. Indicators always have to be
13		taken into context and weighted with the in
14		combination with other indicators.
15	Q	So, for example, the use of a VPN on its own is
16		not enough to indicate that or rather the use
17		of a VPN could occur in the context of a
18		legitimate transaction?
19	А	(PW) Absolutely. And it's also seen, for
20		instance, as good security practice.
21	Q	Thank you. And you would agree that this
22		document has some indicators related to
23		geography?
24	А	(PW) Correct.

And that the FATF in its guidance also has

1		indicators related to geography?
2	A	(PW) Correct.
3	Q	And you would agree that these indicators could
4		lead to transactions being reported or flagged
5		based on the nationality or location of the
6		people who are sending them?
7	A	(PW) Not solely for that purpose. It would have
8		to be in combination with other indicators.
9	Q	Thank you. Would you agree that those
10		indicators could lead to higher levels of
11		surveillance for individuals in certain
12		jurisdictions or sending money to certain
13		jurisdictions?
14	A	(PW) Again, if seen in combination with other
15		indicators.
16	Q	And would you agree that a VASP is likely to err
17		on the side of reporting in the face of a
18		suspicious indicator given their legal
19		obligation to do so?
20	A	(PW) No, I would not agree with that.
21	Q	Okay. Thank you. I have just one last
22		question, which is for Ms. Cieslik. Sorry, I
23		said these were my last questions, but I just
24		thought of one more.

Earlier the province in their

25

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1		cross-examination asked you about preventative
2		approaches that you might recommend for
3		addressing money laundering, and you discussed
4		the benefits of information sharing between the
5		private and public sector. Would you agree that
6		an overabundance of information sharing could
7		raise privacy concerns?
8	A	(CC) Absolutely I would agree with that.
9	MS. I	MAGONET: Thank you. Those are my questions.
10	THE (	COMMISSIONER: Thank you, Ms. Magonet.
11		And now Mr. Gratl on behalf of Transparency
12		International Coalition, who has been allocated
13		30 minutes.
14	MR. 0	GRATL: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. I expect to
15		be to take less time than that.
16	EXAM	INATION BY MR. GRATL:
17	Q	Ms. Cieslik, you'll agree with me that the
18		FINTRAC reporting requirements really only
19		function by requiring a person engaged in a
20		transaction to generate plausible deniability
21		about the source of the funds?
22	А	(CC) I may have to ask to you rephrase that
23		question.
24	Q	Sure. FINTRAC requires both for suspicious

transactions and for transactions that meet the

1		monetary threshold, they require a report of the
2		transaction; is that right?
3	А	(CC) Yeah, that is correct.
4	Q	And then they require some explanation about the
5		source of the funds involved?
6	А	(CC) I would say for the suspicious activity
7		there would be an expectation of a description
8		of what you did to come to your analysis of
9		suspicion and that may include a source of
10		funds, you know, sort of request or result as
11		part of your description.
12	Q	Okay. And so when there is inquiry into the
13		source of funds, really from the point of view
14		of your client as the regulated entity, what
15		you're looking for is the threshold of plausible
16		deniability; right?
17	А	(CC) Yeah, I would I agree with that. I mean,
18		I'd like to point out, though, that, you know,
19		as I think earlier in this testimony is that
20		source of funds is not an explicit regulatory
21		requirement for any specific report or any part
22		of the program. Where it does come in is as a
23		risk-based measure, so it has been mentioned in
24		risk-based guidance, to say that one of the
25		things that you can do to mitigate risk, one of

1		the suggestions, recommendations made by FINTRAC
2		is to look for a reason why it may not be
3		suspicious in the form of a source of funds or a
4		source of wealth.
5		Now, that's separate from I just want to
6		clarify. There is a requirement for
7		politically-exposed persons, but I don't want to
8		muddy the waters by discussing that particular
9		requirement as we're looking at reporting here,
10		unless of course the report was on a
11		politically-exposed person. But it has been
12		documented as a guideline for checking to see
13		what this is to have that, as you said you
14		put it, plausible deniability.
15	Q	Now, in assessing suspiciousness, I take it that
16		the more money the client has or the institution
17		has, the easier it is for them to generate
18		plausible explanations for the transaction?
19	A	(CC) I'm not sure I would necessarily say that.
20		I would say that a larger amount of money would
21		prompt a request for documentation and that
22		potentially it would be easier. Not maybe
23		not easier. I don't want to use that word. But
24		potentially what you would be looking for to
25		validate that would be easier in a larger

$1 \hspace{1cm} {\sf transaction.}$
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2		If I can use a quick example, from my
3		traditional financial space. If someone said
4		that they had sold a property, because it was a
5		large amount of money you might if you might
6		be suspicious about where the source of that
7		came from, and the request that would be made
8		would be evidence of a sale with some
9		documentation.
10	Q	All right. So is it true that the larger the
11		transaction, then, the greater the requirement
12		for due diligence into the source of the funds?
13	А	(CC) I would say taking the risk-based approach,
14		you know, some approaches and some
15		recommendations and guidelines and in
16		discussions with regulators, not just in Canada
17		but around the world, is that larger volumes of
18		activity would need more suspect or under
19		suspicion for some explanation, for some
20		investigation, yes. Or should be.
21	Q	Would it be of assistance if there were
22		statutory or regulatory guidelines in respect of
23		the level of due diligence required for larger
24		transactions?
25	А	(CC) I will agree that over my 20-year career

1	that may have been helpful. I do think it's
2	difficult sort of to set those parameters, but
3	where, you know, the guidelines and the
4	legislation talk about the risk-based approach,
5	it's not so prescriptive and they leave it up to
6	you to determine your risk based on your
7	industry, your client type, the factors that are
8	required to be considered under risk. But there
9	hasn't been a lot in terms of feedback, in my
10	personal opinion, about industry sort of
11	specific expectations.
12	So, you know, if I can give another quick
13	example. I've seen some red flags around bit
14	ATMs saying if some ATM company is doing more
15	volume than another, well, certainly as a
16	competitive amount of knowledge that information
17	is not publicly available to all bit ATMs about
18	what volume their neighbour is doing, and
19	therefore what might be above or beyond that. I
20	would say the same goes for any kind of other
21	product you could mention. You know, how much
22	is casino 1 during versus casino 2 and what
23	would be sort of, you know, an uneven balance
24	that might raise a suspicion a reasonable

grounds of suspicion.

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1		So I think that the maybe the risk-based
2		approach guidance has suffered for maybe not
3		being prescriptive enough. I would caution on
4		some, you know, ranges and level of prescription
5		but certainly would be helpful.
6	Q	Mr. Mueller, I have the same series of questions
7		for you. Do you would you agree that some
8		level of prescription in regulation or statute
9		would be of assistance in determining what level
10		of due diligence is appropriate for high-amount
11		transactions?
12	А	(RM) It would certainly be helpful, when acting
13		as a compliance professional, we do request this
14		information. Absolutely.
15	Q	All right. There was some concern expressed
16		about the utility or futility of monitoring and
17		reporting low-value transactions in the sense
18		that FINTRAC might be given a noisy level of
19		data rather than a useful, the signal would be
20		lost in the noise, in essence. Would it be of
21		assistance to actually have a higher amount as a
22		reporting threshold but put it in the in,
23		say, a temporal aggregate, say, \$10,000 in any
24		given week or a \$100,000 in a given six-month
25		period? Would that improve the signal-to-noise

Exam by Mr.	Gratl	
1		ratio?
2	A	(RM) I think it would depend on the underlying
3		nature of the client. So, for example, if the
4		client or the reporting entity is a liquidity
5		provider, every single transaction is going to
6		meet the volume threshold because they are
7		servicing other high-volume entities.
8		Similarly, there is a useful distinction in the
9		reporting where, let's say, I'm an OTC desk I
10		happen to be and I use my own money to
11		purchase a large amount of bitcoin and that
12		those funds happen to go cross border. Because
13		those aren't client funds, that's not reporting
14		eligible. So because I'm using my own money to
15		purchase to essentially pay an invoice, it's
16		no longer reporting eligible, so that eliminates
17		some of that noise.
18		But I think it would be difficult to find
19		I mean, certainly I think we all kind of agree
20		that the \$10,000 threshold is not as relative to
21		crypto, especially with the current price of
22		bitcoin, but I think, like, a more sensible
23		guideline for aggregating multiple suspicious
24		transactions together would be are they linked.

So, you know, if there's tons of \$500

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1		transactions that fit the typology of smurfing,
2		I would be much more likely to report that
3		regardless of any aggregate dollar amount on
4		that activity.
5	Q	Ms. Cieslik, the same question. Would a higher
6		aggregate amount within a certain temporal
7		framework be more appropriate to reduce the
8		noise-to-signal ratio?
9	А	(CC) I do feel like the \$10,000 number needs to
10		be re-examined, and potentially not even just
11		for crypto but for cash and for wires. Now this
12		application is being put on the large virtual
13		currency transfer, this 10,000. And I'm not
14		privy to and potentially there is behind the
15		scenes, and I don't and I'm not aware of it,
16		any real analysis on the value of that dollar,
17		that particular floor, I guess. And certainly,
18		you know, in the current industry that I work,
19		you know, 10,000 isn't even a number we would
20		get to in a 24-hour time period, you know, so
21		that it would eliminate that from here. But it
22		can vary greatly with the price of bitcoin.
23		I think all that to say is that I think
24		that magic number of 10 ,000 is quite old at

this point and that there needs to be some

1		reconsideration of that for all kinds of
2		threshold for all activities, cash wire and
3		certainly for virtual currency, I'm not sure
4		that it is as relevant.
5	Q	Do you consider that there is a potential for
6		conflict of interest or moral hazard when
7		private business is recruited to conduct what is
8		essentially investigative activities on the part
9		of the government?
10	А	(CC) Yes. I have been noted to be of that
11		opinion. Again, I've worked in this industry
12		now almost 20 years. I originally before I
13		ever worked for the federal government I was a
14		parole officer, so I have some you know, one
15		foot halfway kind of into that. What I have
16		found is my knowledge has matured and my work
17		experience, you know, has spread out over a
18		larger sort of group of financial entities.
19		I do find that the sort of ever pushing of
20		police-type responsibilities onto private
21		business I mean, of course it comes with an
22		inherent challenge of putting private business
23		in these roles. And I think if I can add to
24		that too is that we don't have the same tools
25		available to us that a law enforcement, you

1 know, force would have.

Now, Peter may disagree with me on this.

I'm not sure. But the major tools at a

financial entity investigator's disposal is

Google, potentially, you know, a name listing

service -- World-Check is a commonly known one

-- and, you know, as we've seen from CipherTrace

and Chainalysis some risk-based software.

I think Ryan had mentioned -- you know, he talked about source of funds declarations.

There is sort of an ever-growing list you can ask for this and you can ask for that. And I see it sort of breaching into a privacy threshold, you know, how much information you are being asked to ask of people to contribute to this has put private businesses again, I think, in some awkward positions, conflict of interest as well as competitively.

If someone asks me for my tax return, I would not be willing to provide that. I don't like to ask other people for their tax returns as part of my role. So you know, I prefer to -- you know, the line is a line to tow as to what is appropriate and what is not. And if your competitor down the street is doing no such

1		asking and, again, in efforts to comply with
2		money laundering requirements you have to do
3		some kind of asking, but the you know, so
4		there is a uneven playing field that I think
5		evolves because of that. And I do have concerns
6		about the position it puts businesses in and
7		even compliance officers in in terms of even
8		safety and security and digging into people's
9		activity without protections of law enforcement.
10	Q	Mr. Mueller, I see you nodding. Would you have
11		an addition aside from
12	A	(RM) I mean, I think that I tend to agree with
13		Charlene on a lot of things. The only thing
14		that was really jumping in my mind as we're
15		talking about, you know, the line between
16		privacy and validation of sources of funds and
17		everything, for example, we'll accept a bank
18		statement as proof of address with the account
19		activity redacted and the balance redacted. So
20		perhaps the customer doesn't want us to know
21		where they shop and how much money they have.
22		So I get that as an individual with a bank
23		statement. But as a compliance officer I love
24		to receive the unredacted one because it can
25		illustrate to me if somebody's conducting an

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Q

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1		unregistered MSB and trying to be an agent of my
2		services, or if they are a business with a high
3		incidence of personal purchases on their
4		corporate account, this may put them in a
5		high-risk bucket.
6		So I think I was just kind of you know, I
7		was kind of vibing on those kind of those
8		document kind of red flags while I was listening
9		to what she was saying.
10	Q	Mr. Warrack, do you have a view on that subject?
11	A	(PW) Can you repeat the question. As I
12		understand it, I believe it was around the
13		private sector conducting investigations on
14		behalf of the government.
15	Q	Yes. And in particular whether there is the
16		potential for conflict of interest or a moral
17		hazard in the government essentially recruiting
18		on a non-voluntary basis private business to
19		conduct investigative activities.
20	A	(PW) I think sometimes I think the expertise
21		lies in the private sector as opposed to the
22		public sector.
23	Q	That's
24	A	(PW) If I could give you an sorry, go ahead.

So, Mr. Warrack, you're the Chief Compliance

24

25

right?

(PW) 2018.

Α

Officer for Bitfinex; is that right? 1 2 (PW) That's correct. They're a client. Α 3 You're listed as the Chief Compliance Officer? Q (PW) That's correct. 4 Α 5 0 All right. And that's an officer's role? 6 Α (PW) Yes. You're based in Canada; is that right? You are 7 Q personally resident in Canada? 8 9 Α (PW) I live in Canada. Yeah, that's correct. 10 Now, I looked on the FINTRAC searchable index 0 for registered entities and I was able to find 11 Coinsquare and Netcoins, but I didn't find 12 13 Bitfinex. Is Bitfinex registered as a reporting 14 entity with FINTRAC? 15 (PW) No, Bitfinex isn't registered in Canada. Α 16 Bitfinex is incorporated in the British Virgin 17 Islands. 18 0 All right. But you reside in Canada and you're 19 working for Bitfinex, are you? 20 (PW) I don't work for Bitfinex. I am a -- I Α 21 have a contract with Bitfinex to supply services 22 to the company. 23 Q And you were hired in May of 2019; is that

24

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And was that one month after Bitfinex ran 1 0 2018. 2 into some regulatory trouble? 3 (PW) I can't comment on that. Α I had understood that Bitfinex ran into some 4 5 regulatory trouble in the United States; is that 6 true? (PW) And -- I wouldn't categorize it as trouble. 7 Α Any regulatory interest is still ongoing. 8 9 can't -- I really can't comment on that. 10 All right. And Bitfinex does business in 0 Canada; right? 11 12 (PW) Not -- no, Bitfinex does not do business in Α Canada. 13 14 It doesn't have Canadian customers? 15 (PW) Bitfinex may have Canadian customers but it Α 16 does not do business as a company in Canada. Oh, but it has Canadian customers; is that 17 0 18 right? 19 (PW) Commissioner, I am really not comfortable 20 answering questions on behalf of Bitfinex. I'm 21 testifying here in a private capacity. 22 THE COMMISSIONER: All right. MR. GRATL: 23

I just wonder because we were discussing earlier

about whether FINTRAC has the resources to

Charlene Cieslik (for the commission)
Giles Dixon (for the commission)
Ryan Mueller (for the commission)
Peter Warrack (for the commission)
Discussion re scope of Mr. Gratl's examination

1		engage in enforcement of activities. And do you
2		know whether FINTRAC has the capacity to monitor
3		organizations like Bitfinex to ensure that they
4		are registering when they're required to?
5	А	(PW) I don't have that information.
6	Q	Your website is facing Canada; is that right?
7		The Bitfinex website faces Canada?
8	А	(PW) I'm not sure I understand what you mean by
9		"facing Canada."
10	Q	Well, for IP addresses that are based in Canada,
11		those IP addresses can access Bitfinex's
12		websites and services, can't they?
13	MS. (	CHEWKA: Mr. Commissioner, I'm loath to object to
14		my friend here on his cross-examination, I'm not
15		sure if it's my role, but the witness has
16		objected to answering questions about his
17		business and he's here in a personal capacity.
18		I don't think that you were able to give an
19		opportunity to rule on that. I am just raising
20		that concern as this line of questioning
21		persists.
22	THE (	COMMISSIONER: That's true. I thought that
23		Mr. Gratl had moved off that question into
24		another question. But it seems to me,
25		Mr. Gratl, you're getting into an area that

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Discussion re scope of Mr. Gratl's examination

1	falls outside the scope of what this witness was
2	called to testify about. I and he's
3	expressed some reservations about talking in his
4	capacity as a contractor with the firm Bitfinex
5	as opposed to as an expert witness who has been
6	describing his knowledge and understanding of
7	the regulation of the virtual currency process
8	in Canada. What do you say to that?
9	MR. GRATL: Well, I would say, Mr. Commissioner, that
10	the area in which the witness has been
11	testifying is in respect of the regulatory
12	compliance and specifically with the PCMLTFA and
13	about the capacity of FINTRAC to monitor and
14	enforce compliance with that act, and the
15	witness has personal knowledge of compliance
16	with that act as a result of his, I would say,
17	employment with Bitfinex, and so it would appear
18	to be within the area that he's been called to
19	testify. To my knowledge, if the witness is
20	taking the fifth that is a doctrine of US law.
21	THE COMMISSIONER: I don't think it's a question of
22	him taking the fifth. I think he's expressed
23	some concern about saying things in an official
24	capacity for an organization which he's not
25	really authorized to bind with his testimony.

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1	But I'll ask Ms. Patel what her position is
2	on this.
3	MS. PATEL: I agree with what you just said,
4	Mr. Commissioner. Mr. Warrack came here to give
5	evidence in his capacity as an individual who
6	has knowledge extensive knowledge of the
7	regulatory space, really. And he expressly is
8	not here as a representative of Bitfinex.
9	Correct, Mr. Gratl, Mr. Warrack's been very
10	clear that he's not an employee of Bitfinex.
11	He that it's a contract. Just to correct
12	something you've said there. And he should not
13	be expected to be here giving evidence on behalf
14	of any one of his clients.
15	MR. GRATL: Well, I'm not asking for him to give
16	evidence on behalf of his client; I'm just
17	asking for him to give evidence in his
18	knowledge. Not on behalf.
19	MS. PATEL: If I might, Mr. Commissioner, I think
20	that Mr. Gratl has asked Mr. Warrack what his
21	knowledge is of FINTRAC's ability in terms of
22	its capacity and resources to ensure that
23	entities are registering where they ought to be,
24	and Mr. Warrack has given his answer. So I'd
25	say that he's responded to the question that can

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Exam by Mr.	Gratl	(continuing)
1		be asked.
2	THE	COMMISSIONER: Okay. Yeah, I think it's time to
3		move on.
4	MR.	GRATL: Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
5	EXAM	INATION BY MR. GRATL (continuing):
6	Q	Mr. Warrack, you're you have an ongoing
7		working relationship with the RCMP?
8	А	(PW) That's correct.
9	Q	All right. And is that in your capacity as
10		somebody who's working as an employee or a
11		consultant of Bitfinex or is that in your
12		personal capacity?
13	A	(PW) That is in my personal capacity.
14	Q	All right. And does that use information
15		derived from your employment or association with
16		Bitfinex?
17	A	(PW) No, there's no company information or
18		personal information shared with the RCMP. It's
19		more around not just with the RCMP, but with
20		the OPP, for instance, in terms of best practice
21		in the space of understanding cryptocurrencies,
22		how they work, et cetera.
23	Q	All right. And is there similarly a

relationship with FINTRAC?

(PW) No. I do engage occasionally with FINTRAC.

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Discussion re examinations

1		Actually since I left the Bank of Montreal in
2		2018 I'm no longer a member of any of the
3		working groups or anything like that. I do try
4		and support FINTRAC where I can in terms of best
5		practice. Shared best practice.
6	Q	There's a 20 percent holdings threshold that
7		operates as a barrier to registering with
8		FINTRAC. Are you familiar with that,
9		Mr. Warrack?
10	A	(PW) In relation to what? You mean as a VASP or
11		as a cryptocurrency exchange?
12	Q	As a money service business.
13	A	(PW) Yes. Correct.
14	Q	Does that have any effect on
15		cryptocurrency-related businesses, to your
16		knowledge?
17	A	(PW) Not to my knowledge. I don't know. I
18		don't know the answer to that question.
19	MR.	GRATL: Those are my questions. Thank you,
20		Mr. Commissioner.
21	THE	COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you, Mr. Gratl.
22		Anything arising from that, Ms. Magonet?
23	MS.	MAGONET: No, Mr. Commissioner.
24	THE	COMMISSIONER: Thank you. Ms. Shelley?

MS. SHELLEY: No, Mr. Commissioner.

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Peter Warrack (for the commission)
Discussion re scheduling

1	THE COMMISSIONER: Ms. Chewka?
2	MS. CHEWKA: No, Mr. Commissioner.
3	THE COMMISSIONER: And, Ms. Patel?
4	MS. PATEL: Thank you. No, Mr. Commissioner.
5	THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you. All right.
6	I would like to thank the members of the panel
7	for their participation, and they are now all
8	excused from further testimony.
9	And I take it, Mr. Martland, that we have no
10	witnesses for tomorrow; is that correct?
11	MR. MARTLAND: Yes, Mr. Commissioner. It hasn't
12	happened today but we actually have a day where
13	we're not leading evidence. We're resuming our
14	hearings on Friday morning, 9:30.
15	THE COMMISSIONER: All right. Thank you. We will
16	adjourn until Friday at 9:30.
17	(WITNESSES EXCUSED)
18	THE REGISTRAR: The hearing is stood down until
19	November 27, 2020, at 9:30 a.m. Thank you.
20	(PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 1:37 P.M. TO NOVEMBER 27, 2020)
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